



Applied Knowledge Services
Governance · Social Development · Humanitarian · Conflict

Social Protection

Topic Guide

About this Topic Guide

GSDRC Topic Guides aim to provide a clear, concise and objective report on findings from rigorous research on critical areas of development policy. Rather than provide policy guidance or recommendations, their purpose is to inform policymakers and practitioners of the key debates and evidence on the topic of focus, to support informed decision-making.

Authors and contributors

This GSDRC Topic Guide was written by Evie Browne, and its production was supported by the UK Government. GSDRC appreciates the contributions of:

Catherine Arnold, DFID

Armando Barrientos, Brooks World Poverty Institute

Tim Conway, DFID

Stephen Devereux, IDS

Matthew Greenslade, DFID

Stephen Kidd, Development Pathways

Heather Kindness, DFID

Rachel Slater, ODI

Fabio Veras Soares, International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth

We are also grateful to GSDRC researchers Zoë Scott, Huma Haider and Oliver Walton for their work on previous versions of this guide (2009-12).

About GSDRC

GSDRC is a partnership of research institutes, think-tanks and consultancy organisations with expertise in governance, social development, humanitarian and conflict issues. We provide applied knowledge services on demand and online. Our specialist research team supports a range of international development agencies, synthesising the latest evidence and expert thinking to inform policy and practice.

GSDRC

International Development Department, College of Social Sciences

University of Birmingham, B15 2TT, UK

www.gsdrc.org

Suggested citation

Browne, E. (2015). *Social protection: Topic guide*. Birmingham, UK: GSDRC, University of Birmingham.

© DFID Crown Copyright 2015

This Topic Guide is licensed under the Open Government Licence:

www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/doc/open-government-licence

The views expressed in this report are those of the author, and do not necessarily reflect the opinions of GSDRC, its partner agencies or DFID.

UNIVERSITY OF
BIRMINGHAM

Supported by:



Contents

Executive summary	1
1 What is social protection?	2
1.1 Concepts and definitions	2
1.2 Objectives	2
1.3 Analytical concepts	2
1.4 Selected development partner positions	4
2 Types of social protection	6
2.1 Social assistance	6
2.2 Social insurance	6
2.3 Labour market interventions	7
2.4 Traditional or informal social protection	7
2.5 Other types of social protection	7
3 Global issues and debates	9
3.1 Coverage, scale and systems	9
3.2 Financing and affordability	11
3.3 Political economy	13
3.4 Targeting	14
3.5 Conditionalities	15
3.6 Shocks and risks	16
3.7 Fragile and conflict-affected states	19
3.8 State-building	20
4 Policy objectives and evidence of impacts	21
4.1 Poverty and vulnerability	21
4.2 Education	21
4.3 Health	22
4.4 Nutrition	23
4.5 Graduation	25
4.6 Empowerment	26
4.7 Social exclusion	27
4.8 Economic growth	28

5 Vulnerable groups: needs and challenges 30

5.1 Women and girls	30
5.2 Children	30
5.3 Older people	31
5.4 People with disabilities	32
5.5 Those not reached	33

6 Design and implementation 34

6.1 General manuals	34
6.2 Targeting	34
6.3 Conditionalities	35
6.4 Payment	35
6.5 Accountability	35
6.6 Administrative systems	36
6.7 Monitoring and evaluation	36
6.8 Market impacts	37
6.9 Value for money	37
6.10 Complementary interventions	37

Executive summary

Social protection is commonly understood as “*all public and private initiatives that provide income or consumption transfers to the poor, protect the vulnerable against livelihood risks and enhance the social status and rights of the marginalised; with the overall objective of reducing the economic and social vulnerability of poor, vulnerable and marginalised groups*” (Devereux & Sabates-Wheeler, 2004: i).

This guide provides an overview of social protection concepts, approaches, issues, debates and the evidence. It primarily focuses on longer-term developmental social protection, rather than humanitarian responses, and on low-income countries, drawing on other contexts where appropriate. The aim is to provide an overview of issues, a selection of key references and signposting to further resources, rather than an exhaustive guide.

Two main rationales for supporting social protection recur across the literature. One is that social protection is a human right. A second rationale is that social protection is instrumental to the achievement of a broader range of development goals, including poverty reduction, education, health, social inclusion, empowerment and state-building, among others.

Evidence on social protection is extremely robust in some areas, and weak in others. Cash transfers are very well studied and have produced rigorous, comparative evidence on what works. Social insurance has a moderately robust evidence base. Labour market interventions are less studied, but have moderately robust evidence. Sectorally, there is strong evidence on poverty reduction, and improved children’s health and education access. The weakest evidence is in showing impacts on social outcomes, such as women’s empowerment and social inclusion; and in whether social protection increases economic growth. The evidence is thus clustered around measurable service-access and human development impacts, with less evidence on longer-term, social development goals. Although social protection programmes often have a long-term outlook, the evidence base does not have many longitudinal studies. Overall, the evidence suggests that social protection has had positive effects on child and maternal health; primary and secondary education enrolment and attendance; and poverty reduction.

A major recent shift in thinking is away from fragmented social protection programmes towards **comprehensive social protection systems**. This has largely been driven by donors, who are now investing in building integrated social protection systems. It also ties to an increasing focus on fiscal space and domestic financing of social protection, to ensure secure and sustainable social protection systems over the long-term. **Areas of debate remain**. These include conditionality, targeting and graduation. There is positive evidence for both unconditional and conditional transfers, and for different targeting methods, without clearly generalisable lessons on what works best. The literature is in agreement that social protection has important developmental effects, but that it alone is insufficient to lift households out of poverty.

1 What is social protection?

1.1 Concepts and definitions

Social protection is concerned with protecting and helping those who are poor and vulnerable, such as children, women, older people, people living with disabilities, the displaced, the unemployed, and the sick. There are ongoing debates about which interventions constitute social protection, and which category they fit under, as social protection overlaps with a number of livelihoods, human capital and food security interventions (Harvey et al., 2007).

Social protection is commonly understood as ‘all public and private initiatives that provide income or consumption transfers to the poor, protect the vulnerable against livelihood risks and enhance the social status and rights of the marginalised; with the overall objective of reducing the economic and social vulnerability of poor, vulnerable and marginalised groups’ (Devereux & Sabates-Wheeler, 2004: i).

This definition is in line with usage in international development, and may be different from social policy definitions in high-income countries. Social protection is usually provided by the state; it is theoretically conceived as part of the ‘state-citizen’ contract, in which states and citizens have rights and responsibilities to each other (Harvey et al., 2007).

1.2 Objectives

The objectives of social protection vary widely, from reducing poverty and vulnerability, building human capital, empowering women and girls, improving livelihoods, and responding to economic and other shocks. As a result, the form and function of social protection programmes can be quite disparate, according to the particular objective (Hanlon et al., 2010: 28).

‘Safety nets’ are a form of social protection which help people meet immediate basic needs in times of crisis. Typical short-term goals are to mitigate the immediate impact of shocks and to smooth consumption. The World Bank has a slightly different definition, which defines ‘safety nets’ as social assistance programmes (Gentilini et al., 2014).

Other forms of social protection aim at longer-term development and enabling people to move permanently out of poverty (Babajanian et al., 2014). Long-term goals include improving opportunities for inclusive growth, human capital development, equity and social stability. Some social protection programmes intend to be transformative, supporting equity, empowerment and human rights.

1.3 Analytical concepts

There are several different conceptual approaches to analysing social protection objectives and impacts. Each conceptualises potential impacts in different ways: transformation; human capital; vulnerability; and human rights. There are few theories of change; the best-developed ones are on cash transfers, which can be found in Browne (2013).

Devereux and Sabates-Wheeler (2004) provide the most commonly used conceptual framework, which describes four social protection functions:

- **Protective:** providing relief from deprivation (e.g. income benefits, state pensions)
- **Preventative:** averting deprivation (e.g. savings clubs, social insurance)
- **Promotive:** enhancing incomes and capabilities (e.g. inputs)
- **Transformative:** social equity and inclusion, empowerment and rights (e.g. labour laws)

The first three functions (the three Ps in the PPP+T framework) were originally conceptualised by the ILO. The addition of the transformative element positions social protection not just to alleviate poverty but to transform lives, through pursuing policies that rebalance the unequal power relations which cause vulnerabilities. In practice, social protection interventions usually cover multiple functions and objectives.

Most social protection frameworks also conceptualise social protection as an **investment in human capital** which increases capacities and the accumulation of productive assets (Barrientos, 2010), breaking the intergenerational transmission of poverty. Social protection contributes to human capital either directly, by providing food, skills and services; or indirectly, by providing cash and access, which enable households to invest in their own development.

Another common theory is that social protection **reduces vulnerability and risk** by providing protection against shocks. This assumes that vulnerability to hazards constrains human and economic development (Barrientos & Hulme, 2009), and that risk management stabilises income and consumption, and is an investment in poverty reduction (Devereux & Sabates-Wheeler, 2007).

A small number of countries (including India, South Africa and Uruguay) and organisations recognise social protection as a **human right and an entitlement** against low standards of living (Jones & Shahrokh, 2013).

Key texts

Devereux, S. & Sabates-Wheeler, R. (2004). *Transformative social protection*. IDS Working Paper 232. Brighton: IDS.

<http://www.ids.ac.uk/files/dmfile/Wp232.pdf>

How can the broader, transformative potential for social protection be implemented in pro-poor programming? This paper outlines the transformative framework for social protection, which can achieve any of the four objectives: Protective: providing relief from deprivation; Preventative: averting deprivation; Promotive: enhancing incomes and capabilities; Transformative: social equity and inclusion, empowerment and rights. It argues against the welfare-ist approach to social protection, and posits that social protection can achieve more than economic security.

Barrientos, A. & Hulme, D. (2009). *Social Protection for the Poor and Poorest in Developing Countries: Reflections on a Quiet Revolution: Commentary*. *Oxford Development Studies*, 37(4), 439-456.

<http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13600810903305257>

The rapid rise of social protection can be considered a 'quiet revolution'. How has this happened and what is its future potential? In the last decade, social protection has become one of three main elements of development, along with growth and human development. Its conceptual basis has moved from a focus on risk to a broader focus on basic needs and capabilities. This is also reflected in practice, with a rapid scaling up of programmes and policies combining income transfers with basic services, employment guarantees or asset building. Three factors will determine the future course of social protection in developing countries: the role of external actors, the bottlenecks of sustainable finance and delivery capacity, and politics. Current evidence gaps are: (1) scaling up social protection coverage to the national level in low-income countries; and (2) extending social protection into fragile states and difficult environments.

Devereux, S. & Sabates-Wheeler, R. (2007). *Editorial introduction: Debating social protection*. *IDS Bulletin*, 38(3), 1-7.

<http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1759-5436.2007.tb00363.x/abstract>

This paper presents five conceptual frameworks for social protection: Social Risk Management (World Bank); Transformative Social Protection (IDS Sussex); Asset Thresholds (Michael Carter and Christopher Barrett); the POVNET approach (DAC/OECD); and the Universal Social Minimum (Koy Thomson/ActionAid). The second part of the special issue looks at practice, focusing on the areas of debates over conditionality, cash vs food, and targeting.

Jones, N. & Shahrokh, T. (2013). *Social protection pathways: shaping social justice outcomes for the most marginalised, now and post-2015*. London: ODI.

<http://www.odi.org.uk/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/8390.pdf>

The potential of social protection to promote social justice outcomes for diverse marginalised social groups is increasingly being recognised. This Background Note provides a theory of change for understanding macro- to micro-impact pathways for transformative social protection. The research highlights that in order to tackle multidimensional vulnerability in a sustainable way, it is vital for social protection programmes to be designed and governed to promote social inclusion and accountability.

See also:

Browne, E. (2013). *Theories of Change for Cash Transfers*. (GSDRC Helpdesk Research Report 913), Birmingham, UK: GSDRC, University of Birmingham.

<http://www.gsdr.org/go/display&type=Helpdesk&id=913>

1.4 Selected development partner positions

International Labour Organization

The ILO views social protection as a human right. It focuses on employment, particularly the decent work agenda,¹ which extends rights to informal workers as well as the formally employed. It co-leads the Social Protection Floor Initiative² within the UN, which promotes a basic set of social transfers and universal access to essential social services. It emphasises the need to implement comprehensive, coherent and coordinated social protection and employment policies to guarantee services and income security across the life cycle, paying particular attention to vulnerable groups.

Strategy document: ILO. (2012). *Social Security for all: Building social protection floors and comprehensive social security systems*. Geneva: ILO. http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_emp/---emp_ent/---multi/documents/publication/wcms_213761.pdf

World Bank

The Bank links social protection to labour and jobs. The Bank's 2012-2022 Social Protection and Labour strategy has the main objective of helping countries move from fragmented approaches to harmonised systems. The overarching goals of the strategy are to help improve resilience, equity, and opportunity for people in both low- and middle-income countries. Social protection helps individuals and societies to manage risk and volatility; alleviates chronic poverty and protects from deprivation; and promotes equality of opportunity through building human capital and equipping people to improve their livelihoods.

Strategy document: World Bank. (2011). *Resilience Equity and Opportunity: 2012-2022 Social Protection and Labor Strategy*. Washington DC: World Bank. <http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTSOCIALPROTECTION/0,,contentMDK:23043115~pagePK:210058~piPK:210062~theSitePK:282637,00.html>

European Commission

The EC views social protection as helping reduce poverty and vulnerability, and underpinning inclusive and sustainable development. The 2010 European Report on Development calls for social protection to

¹ <http://www.ilo.org/global/about-the-ilo/decent-work-agenda/social-protection/lang--en/index.htm>

² <http://www.ilo.org/public/english/protection/spfag/socialfloor/index.htm>

be made an integral part of EU development policy. The goal of EU development cooperation in supporting social protection is to improve equity and efficiency in provision, while supporting social inclusion and cohesion.

Key document: European Commission. (2012). *Social Protection in European Union Development Cooperation*. (Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee, and the Committee of the Regions.) Brussels: EC.
<http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52012DC0446&from=EN>

International Monetary Fund

The IMF did not engage directly with social protection until recently (Barrientos & Hulme, 2009). In the wake of the global financial crisis, it has supported spending on social safety nets in select countries.³ It does not have a social protection strategy.

DFID (UK government)

DFID defines social protection as a sub-set of public actions that help address risk, vulnerability and chronic poverty. It has mainly focused on social assistance, particularly social and cash transfers. It is supportive of the move from fragmented social protection programmes to comprehensive systems.

Key document: Arnold, C., with Conway, T. & Greenslade, M. (2011). *Cash Transfers Literature Review*. London: Department for International Development.
<http://r4d.dfid.gov.uk/PDF/Articles/cash-transfers-literature-review.pdf>

DFAT (Australian government)

DFAT focuses on publicly funded initiatives that provide regular and predictable cash or in-kind transfers to individuals, households and communities to reduce poverty and vulnerability and foster resilience and empowerment.⁴ Its approach has three pillars—food and nutrition security, education and health. It also focuses on developing integrated social protection systems.

Strategy document: DFAT. (2014). *DFAT Social Protection Framework*. Canberra: Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. <http://aid.dfat.gov.au/Publications/Documents/social-protection-framework.pdf>

GIZ (German government)

GIZ's social protection work helps establish integrated social security systems and extends coverage to groups of people who have hitherto been excluded from social protection. The main target groups are poor families and those threatened with poverty.⁵ It aims to facilitate social justice, basic protection against poverty, and provide micro-insurance.⁶

See also:

Hinds, R. (2014). *Defining social protection systems* (GSDRC Helpdesk Research Report 1085). Birmingham, UK: GSDRC, University of Birmingham.
<http://www.gsdrc.org/go/display&type=Helpdesk&id=1085>

³ <http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/protect.htm>

⁴ <http://aid.dfat.gov.au/Publications/Pages/social-protection-framework.aspx>

⁵ <http://www.giz.de/expertise/html/3866.html>

⁶ https://www.giz.de/en/ourservices/social_development.html

2 Types of social protection

2.1 Social assistance

Social assistance is direct, regular and predictable cash or in-kind resources transfers to poor and vulnerable individuals or households (Arnold et al., 2011: 91). It is usually provided by the state and financed by national taxes (Barrientos, 2010). Support from donors is also important in lower income contexts. Transfers are non-contributory, i.e. the full amount is paid by the provider. Some are targeted based on categories of vulnerability, and some are targeted broadly to low-income groups. This is the primary form of social protection available in most developing countries (Barrientos, 2010).

Cash transfers: are direct, regular and predictable transfers that raise and smooth incomes to reduce poverty and vulnerability (Arnold et al., 2011:2). Unconditional Cash Transfers (UCTs) are for the beneficiary to decide how to spend. Conditional Cash Transfers (CCTs) are given with the requirement that the beneficiary meets certain conditions – often related to human capital development, such as visiting a health clinic or ensuring children go to school.

Social pensions: are state pensions, a form of cash transfer targeted by age. Pensions are the most common social protection tool, with the widest global coverage and often highest national spend.

In-kind transfers: are economic and livelihood asset transfers to households, facilitating income generation. They tend to be larger, one-off transfers but can also be smaller, regular transfers, such as food transfers. They tend to take an integrated approach, linking the transfer with skills training and other activities (Holmes & Jones, 2013: 65).

School feeding: is a free nutritious meal at school – usually lunch – and sometimes take-home rations for children most in need. This is a type of in-kind assistance. These are near-universal – most countries that can afford to provide food for their schoolchildren do so (Bundy et al., 2009). They help encourage parents to keep children in school (Norton et al., 2001).

Public works programmes (PWPs; or Public Employment Programmes): provide jobs on infrastructure projects for cash or food. They are sometimes classified as labour market interventions depending on whether their function is primarily poverty alleviation, job creation, or social protection. They are politically popular although arguably inefficient (Norton et al., 2001).

2.2 Social insurance

These are contributory programmes where participants make regular payments to a scheme that will cover costs related to life-course events, for example, maternity, unemployment or illness (Barrientos, 2010). Sometimes costs are matched or subsidised by the scheme provider. Social insurance includes contributory pensions; health, unemployment, or disaster insurance; and funeral assistance (Norton et al., 2001). It can be provided formally through a bank or employer, or informally through a community-based pooled fund. Social insurance is strongly linked to the formal labour market, meaning coverage is often limited to formal workers.

2.3 Labour market interventions

Labour market interventions provide protection for poor people who are able to work, and aim to ensure basic standards and rights (Barrientos, 2010). Interventions can be active or passive:

- Active labour market policies aim to help the unemployed and the most vulnerable find jobs, through interventions such as job centres, training, and policies to promote small and medium sized enterprises.
- Passive interventions include maternity benefits, injury compensation, and sickness benefits for those already in work, financed by the employer. Passive interventions also include changes to legislation, for example establishing a minimum wage or safe working conditions.

Many poor people work within the informal sector, and some people with disabilities, the chronically ill and old may not be able to work at all, so labour market interventions cannot always reach them.

2.4 Traditional or informal social protection

Formal social protection systems do not offer complete coverage and inevitably exclude parts of the population. Traditional community-based forms of social protection distribute risk within a community and fill some of the gaps left by formal interventions (Norton et al., 2001). They are often self-funded, for example funeral insurance savings groups, but can be externally funded by the state or donors. Formal social protection should be carefully managed to enhance, rather than disrupt, existing informal systems (Harvey et al., 2007).

2.5 Other types of social protection

Social care and support is highly complementary to social protection, and sometimes considered to be social protection, as a form of social assistance. UNICEF recognises that social support helps address the interaction between social and economic vulnerability, through services such as home-based care and family support services (UNICEF, 2012).

Government or private sector subsidies are sometimes classified as social protection if they enhance access for the poor or act as safety nets. Subsidies can keep prices low for basic goods and services consumed by the poor (Norton et al., 2001). However, subsidies are often regressive. The Middle East and North Africa spend four per cent of GDP on fuel subsidies, which represents a form of social assistance, but most of the benefit goes to upper-income groups (Gentilini et al., 2014).

Price support is state intervention to protect market prices for the goods produced by the poor, which can smooth income. There is a tendency for these temporary measures to become permanent, which institutionalises unprofitable production (Norton et al., 2001).

Key texts

Arnold, C., with Conway, T. & Greenslade, M. (2011). *Cash Transfers Literature Review*. London: Department for International Development.

<http://r4d.dfid.gov.uk/PDF/Articles/cash-transfers-literature-review.pdf>

What impact do cash transfers have on reducing poverty and increasing the resilience of poor households? This comprehensive literature review assesses the evidence and looks at the extent to which it can be generalised. It shows how design and financing features help to maximise transfers' effectiveness in a range of circumstances. Ultimately, cash transfers work as part of a broader strategy to achieve economic and social development.

Barrientos, A. (2010). *Social Protection and Poverty*. Social Policy and Development Programme Paper Number 42. Geneva: United Nations Research Institute for Social Development.

<http://www.unrisd.org/publications/pp-barrientos>

What is the potential for social protection programmes to address poverty and vulnerability in developing countries? This comprehensive report provides an overview of social protection and an assessment of its impact in Latin America, South and East Asia, and Sub-Saharan Africa. Countries with stronger social protection show lower levels of poverty and vulnerability and are more resilient in the face of social and economic change or shock. However, financial sustainability and capacity limitations are challenges that must be addressed. It is helpful to view social protection financing as a 'remix' of public expenditure rather than a new expense.

Bundy, D., Burbano, C., Grosh, M., Gelli, A., Jukes, M., & Drake, L. (2009). *Rethinking School Feeding – Social Safety Nets, Child Development and the Education Sector*. Rome: World Food Programme and World Bank. (Executive Summary).

<http://documents.wfp.org/stellent/groups/public/documents/newsroom/wfp204667.pdf>

This review provides guidance on how to develop and implement effective school feeding programmes, both as a productive safety net, as part of the response to the global crises, and as a fiscally sustainable investment in human capital. Available data suggest that every country for which we have information is seeking to provide food, in some way and at some scale, to its schoolchildren.

Norton, A., Conway, T. & Foster, M. (2001). *Social protection concepts and approaches: Implications for policy and practice in international development*. Working Paper 143, London: ODI.

<http://www.odi.org.uk/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/2999.pdf>

How can international agencies contribute to improving the coverage and effectiveness of social protection as a component of poverty reduction strategies? This ODI paper reviews conceptual developments of the meaning and importance of social protection and looks at experience of different policy instruments.

See also:

Browne, E. (2013). *Community-based social protection* (GSDRC Helpdesk Research Report 1020). Birmingham, UK: GSDRC, University of Birmingham.

<http://www.gsdrc.org/go/display&type=Helpdesk&id=1020>

3 Global issues and debates

3.1 Coverage, scale and systems

The last 15 years have seen a huge increase in social protection programmes, both the number of programmes and number of countries which have programmes (Gentilini et al., 2014). In Sub-Saharan Africa in 2010, 21 countries had unconditional cash transfer programmes; in 2013, this number had almost doubled to 37 countries. Globally, the number of countries with conditional cash transfers increased from 27 in 2008 to 52 in 2013 (Gentilini et al., 2014). The World Bank estimates that more than 1 billion people in developing countries participate in at least one social assistance programme (Gentilini et al., 2014). There is wide variation in coverage, with most programmes only reaching the middle poor and middle-income countries, not the extreme poor (Gentilini et al., 2014). In particular, low-income countries struggle to extend coverage to a significant proportion of people in poverty, on average only reaching 10 per cent of the population (Gentilini et al., 2014).

The increase in social protection programmes has resulted in moving away from fragmented individual programmes towards **integrated social protection systems** (Gentilini et al., 2014). At the smallest level, pilot programmes can be effective in testing concepts, stimulating government interest and demonstrating feasibility and impact, but there is little evidence that pilot programmes lead to national programmes (Garcia & Moore, 2012: 170; IATT, 2008). Pilots may even detract from or undermine government efforts, by their focus on demonstrating impact rather than building functional systems (IATT, 2008). Historically, most countries have implemented a programmatic approach, typically following the sequence: employment injury; old-age pensions, disability and survivors' benefits; sickness, health and maternity coverage; and finally child and unemployment benefits (ILO, 2014).

More recently, efforts have focused on building and strengthening comprehensive social protection systems. This includes governmental institutions to steer and coordinate social protection strategy; management information systems; and unified registries of beneficiary information (Gentilini et al., 2014). An effective system needs attention at the administrative, programme and policy levels (World Bank, 2011). This move towards systems thinking⁷ has also contributed to the large increase in the number of countries with a national social protection policy or strategy (Gentilini et al., 2014).

Scale

Social protection in low-income contexts typically comprises fragmented approaches and programmes, which make coordinated scale-up difficult (IATT, 2008). There is broad agreement in the literature that social protection works best when it is integrated with social services and social security, and scale-up should aim towards integrating individual programmes into a holistic state-led social protection system. Effective scale-up requires systems thinking rather than a focus on particular sectors or demographics (IATT, 2008).

Scale-up often means moving from donor-funded pilot schemes to formal adoption of the concept as public policy by governments (Ellis, 2012). There is a correlation between institutional location and income: as countries' GDP increases, social protection programmes move from being donor or NGO-owned, towards being housed within government ministries (Garcia & Moore, 2012: 138). Scale-up thus requires domestic and political support (Garcia & Moore, 2012: 188). This makes scale-up a political

⁷ Systems thinking is a holistic approach based on the belief that each part of a system is best understood in the context of its relationships with other parts and other systems. Conceptually this means analysing the social, economic and political spheres around the object of analysis.

process, but scaling-up has usually focused on technical solutions rather than strategies to generate political will and commitment (IATT, 2008).

Key texts

Gentilini, U., Honorati, M. & Yemtsov, R. (2014). *The state of social safety nets 2014*. Washington DC: World Bank.

<http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2014/05/19487568/state-social-safety-nets-2014>

This global report provides information on the state of social safety nets in developing and emerging countries. The World Bank definition of 'safety nets' largely refers to social assistance programmes. Using data from 146 countries the report provides new estimates on the coverage of social safety net programmes, their features, level of government spending, and recent empirical evidence. It also reviews important policy and practical developments and highlights emerging innovations.

Garcia, M. & Moore, C. (2012). *The cash dividend: the rise of cash transfer programs in Sub-Saharan Africa*. Washington DC: World Bank.

<http://dx.doi.org/10.1596/978-0-8213-8897-6>

This review examines 120 CT programmes implemented in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) between 2000-2009. The book presents the results of impact evaluations, and the political economy of programmes. It highlights the idiosyncrasies of SSA and presents lessons learned. As the programmes are diverse, there are a number of context-specific conclusions, responding to the unique challenges of the region. Particularly, SSA programmes are more often unconditional, address basic welfare issues such as food security, have a high level of community involvement, do not focus on women as recipients, and use new technologies such as mobile phones.

Inter-Agency Task Team (IATT) on Children and HIV and AIDS: Working Group on Social Protection. (2008). *Expanding Social Protection for Vulnerable Children and Families: Learning from an Institutional Perspective*. Inter-Agency Task Team (IATT) on Children and HIV and AIDS: Working Group on Social Protection. http://www.unicef.org/aids/files/Expanding_Social_Protection.MTemin.May2008.pdf

Which ministry is best placed to maximise social protection effectiveness? This paper reviews established national social protection programmes in eight countries to examine experiences of scaling up. It examines institutional dynamics by looking at the location of programmes within ministries, leadership and drivers of change, and promotes a holistic, integrated approach. It finds that relations between ministries are an important factor determining effectiveness. It notes that cash transfers often dominate the dialogue, which detracts from comprehensive programming and is less effective than a broader focus on integrating social transfers and social services. Success depends on clear leadership, finance coordination, and donor harmonisation, including support from a senior government official.

ILO. (2014). *World Social Protection Report 2014/15: Building economic recovery, inclusive development and social justice*. International Labour Organization.

<http://www.ilo.org/global/research/global-reports/world-social-security-report/2014/lang--en/index.htm>

This report offers a comprehensive body of evidence both on the impressive progress made over the last few years and on the remaining gaps that need to be filled. Based on a life-cycle approach, the report provides an overview of the current organisation of social protection systems, coverage, benefits and expenditures for children, women and men of working age, and older people. It also analyses trends and recent policies, and calls for the expansion of social protection in pursuit of crisis recovery, inclusive development and social justice.

World Bank. (2011). *Resilience Equity and Opportunity: 2012-2022 Social Protection and Labor Strategy*. Washington DC: World Bank.

<http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTSOCIALPROTECTION/0,,contentMDK:23043115~pagePK:210058~piPK:210062~theSitePK:282637,00.html>

The World Bank strategy paper outlines its 10-year plan on social protection and labour. The overarching goals of the strategy are to help improve resilience, equity, and opportunity for people in both low- and

middle-income countries. The strategic direction is to help developing countries move from fragmented approaches to more harmonised systems. This new strategy addresses gaps in current practice by helping make social protection and labour more responsive, more productive, and more inclusive of excluded regions and groups—notably low-income countries and the very poor, the disabled, those in the informal sector and women.

Ellis, F. (2012). 'We Are All Poor Here': Economic Difference, Social Divisiveness and Targeting Cash Transfers in Sub-Saharan Africa. *The Journal of Development Studies* 48(2), 201-214.

<http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00220388.2011.625408>

This peer-reviewed article looks at the social costs and political acceptability of social transfers. It argues that cash transfers targeted to the poorest must be of a very low monetary value, otherwise they create social tension and threaten social cohesion. Poverty-targeted transfers are the least likely to be adopted and scaled up by governments, while broader-targeted transfers such as pensions are more likely to be adopted by governments. The article identifies critical trade-offs between the cost and coverage of different types of social transfer, their social acceptability and their political traction.

3.2 Financing and affordability

Sources of funding

- **Government:** Most social protection is funded by national taxes, with some support from donors depending on the level of national resources available (Hanlon et al., 2010: 154). Since few people in developing countries are in formal-sector employment, tax funding tends to come from indirect or consumption taxes (Hanlon et al., 2010: 154). Governments can support social protection programmes by reallocating expenditure; obtaining aid grants; or borrowing (Grosh et al., 2008) or they can support social protection more generally through macroeconomic policy; public expenditure; tax policy; and regulation (Barrientos, 2007).
- **Development assistance:** For donors, using country systems is a central Paris principle, which can mean funding through general and sector budget support. Budget support can enable linkages across sectors and is more flexible than structural adjustment or programme-specific funding (Barrientos, 2007). Donors are not always able to commit to a medium or long-term timeframe, so partnership with government may be the best approach, where donors provide start-up funds and governments gradually take over the programme (Barrientos, 2007; Harris, 2013).
- **Household:** The second largest source of social protection financing is out-of-pocket expenses paid by service users, but this mainly applies to health expenses (Barrientos, 2007). People may choose between a number of options for financing social protection: investment in human capital (self-protection); savings; and insurance (Barrientos, 2007). Micro-savings may be an appropriate way to self-fund as they are effective in small losses-high frequency contingencies although, if micro-finance institutions make savings compulsory and discourage easy access to withdrawals, they may provide only limited social protection (Barrientos, 2007).

Where programmes are operating well and only require funding, the literature is in agreement that a mix of financing sources is more sustainable than donor funding alone. Improving the efficiency of the tax system is an important part of increasing government social spending (Hanlon et al., 2010). There is a strong concern in the literature that donor funding is less predictable, long-term and sustainable than domestic financing, and that domestic resource mobilisation should be the priority (Garcia & Moore, 2012: 187; Harris, 2013).

There is a consensus among donors that moving towards funding and support of social protection systems is preferable to just supporting individual programmes. The Social Protection Floors approach

aims to build integrated social protection systems over time. It highlights the importance of increasing fiscal space, to create secure and sustainable financing over the long term (Harris, 2013).

Costs of social protection

Using benchmarking data from 87 developing and transition countries, and OECD and World Bank expenditure reviews, Grosh et al. (2008) estimate that most developing countries spend around one to two per cent of GDP on social protection. There is variation, with some middle-income countries (MICs) spending a lower percentage than some low income countries (LICs). The World Bank review in 2014 shows that 107 developing and emerging countries spend an average of 1.6 per cent of GDP on social assistance (Gentilini et al., 2014).

The ILO assessed the potential costs of a package of basic social protection⁸ as a range between 2.2 and 5.7 per cent of GDP (Arnold et al., 2011: 69), which the ILO concludes is affordable. The cost of social protection is driven, in part, by the transfer value. DFID suggest that cash transfer programmes cost between 8 and 17 GBP per beneficiary per month (Arnold et al., 2011: 64).

Key texts

Hanlon, J., Barrientos, A. & Hulme, D. (2010). *Just Give Money to the Poor: The Development Revolution from the Global South*. Sterling, VA: Kumarian Press.

<http://books.google.co.uk/books?id=M2WWHizQON0C&printsec=frontcover#v=onepage&q&f=false>

Are cash transfers affordable and practical in low income countries? Chapter 9 provides an overview of the mechanics and costs of cash transfers (CTs) and argues that they can be used even in the poorest countries, if governments take control, and design and fund their own programmes. It examines some of the costs of financing CTs and concludes that improving the tax system is central to affordability. Donors maintain their own agendas in funding CTs (usually preferring human capital and safety nets objectives rather than redistribution), and LICs must develop autonomy from donors to utilise social protection for long-term development.

Barrientos, A. (2007). *Financing Social Protection*. BWPI Working Paper 5. Manchester: Brooks World Poverty Institute (BWPI).

http://www.bwpi.manchester.ac.uk/medialibrary/publications/working_papers/bwpi-wp-0507.pdf

The paper considers the main sources and key constraints of the financing mix for social protection in middle- and low-income countries. It argues that achieving an appropriate financing mix is essential to ensure the resources required are available. It concludes that regressive but efficient taxation, coupled with progressive social protection expenditures, could be the most effective strategy for expanding social protection. Improving efficiency in collecting existing taxes is the priority. As these options are limited, external finance is crucial to supporting social protection in low-income countries (LICs). Three main donor approaches are assessed: structural adjustment finance; general budget support; and programme or project aid. It suggests budget support may be the most appropriate route. Donors can provide funding in the short-term while governments increase tax revenue.

Grosh, M., del Ninno, C., Tesliuc, E. & Ouerghi, A. (2008). *For Protection and Promotion: The Design and Implementation of Effective Safety Nets*. Washington DC: World Bank.

http://siteresources.worldbank.org/SPLP/Resources/461653-1207162275268/For_Protection_and_Promotion908.pdf

How have safety nets been financed, and are there alternative options? Chapter 3 reviews financing and spending on safety nets, suggesting that reallocating funds from other expenditure is the preferable source of financing. Raising taxation and donor finance both have political economy costs and benefits

⁸ Old age pensions and disability pensions; basic child benefits; and public works for 10 per cent of the population.

which need to be weighed. The best possible strategy is to fund safety nets counter-cyclically, meaning funding is increased in times of growth to protect against times of crisis, but few governments manage this. Both central and local government have a role to play in managing safety nets, which presents challenges for coordination and responsibility.

Harris, E. (2013). Financing social protection floors: Considerations of fiscal space. *International Social Security Review*, 66(3-4), 111-143. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/issr.12021>

Effective and affordable social protection is within reach of even the poorest countries. Many are putting into place elements of a social protection floor, aiming to scale up and add other components over time. Both domestic and external resources have been used effectively. This article argues that policy decisions must carefully consider the sustainability and predictability of funding sources, and their implications for future fiscal space. Domestic resource mobilisation is the priority in establishing and expanding a social protection floor.

See also:

Lucas, B. (2010). *Financing and Cost-effectiveness of Cash Transfer Schemes: What does the evidence base on the costing, financing and cost effectiveness of cash transfer schemes tell us?* (GSDRC Helpdesk Research Report 701). Birmingham, UK: GSDRC, University of Birmingham.

<http://www.gsdrc.org/go/display&type=Helpdesk&id=611>

3.3 Political economy

There is growing recognition that decisions about social protection are political, and politics determines the level and outcomes of social protection (Hickey, 2009).

Social protection has several areas of political debate and ideological contestation. Targeting is a common debate. For example, the means-tested cash transfer for children in Mongolia was later changed to a universal child benefit as the government adopted more populist and socialist values (Slater & Farrington, 2009). Dependency is a second area of debate. Governments in Sub-Saharan Africa are much more likely to choose Public Works Programmes (PWP) for the able-bodied poor than UCTs and to limit programmes' duration, as this is seen as preventing dependency on hand-outs (McCord, 2012). Pensions are historically popular for decision-makers, as they tend to benefit whole households, to be financed from government revenues, and, occasionally, to serve wider objectives such as nation-building (Hujo & Cook, 2012). In practice, how these debates are resolved depends on fiscal space, public support, and the political power of the different ministries involved.

Public support and acceptability is a key factor in social protection policy decisions. Safety nets are publically popular up to a certain level of spending, at which point support switches to social welfare and policies such as insurance, health and education services (Grosh et al., 2008: 67). Provision of public goods through social protection can also increase popularity among recipient voters (Zucco, 2011), generating immediate political returns. These may potentially alienate wealthy or higher tax payers if they are excluded from social protection benefits (Slater & Farrington, 2009). Different factors affect different groups' support for social protection, such as who pays, who benefits, and the perceived value or threat of the programme.

Key texts

Hickey, S. (2009). The politics of protecting the poorest: moving beyond the "anti-politics machine"? *Political Geography* 28(8), 473-483. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.polgeo.2009.11.003>

What forms of politics lie behind social protection interventions that have successfully reduced poverty in developing countries? This paper shows that liberal tenets are not as important as deeper political processes in securing poverty reduction. Case-study analysis in eight countries demonstrates that the most important political factors in pro-poor politics and poverty reduction are political society rather

than civil society, followed by the state-society 'contract' and domestic interactions, rather than 'ownership' and external actors. These findings suggest significant rethinking is required within international development regarding the forms of politics that are presumed to be pro-poor.

McCord, A. (2012). *The politics of social protection: why are public works programmes so popular with governments and donors?* Background Paper. London: ODI.

<http://www.odi.org.uk/publications/6515-political-economy-social-protection-public-works-programmes>

This note is an initial exploration of the political economy and reasons for the popularity of PWPs to promote social protection and employment in low-income and fragile states. The research indicates that the expected benefits of PWPs are not necessarily based on evidence of positive impacts and outcomes, and decisions to implement these programmes are rather based on political choices. Political economy analysis is a useful tool for analysing these decision-making processes.

Hujo, K. & Cook, S. (2012). 'Political Economy of Social Pensions in Asia'. In Sri Wening Handayani and Babken Babajanian (eds.). *Social Protection for Older Persons: Social Pensions in Asia*. 11-59.

<http://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/pub/2012/social-protection-older-persons.pdf>

This chapter explores why countries in Asia have adopted social pension programmes and which factors have influenced their design. It provides an understanding of the politics of social pension reform in Asia and identifies policy lessons. There are clear differences among countries, but there are some points of convergence over which conditions are conducive to the introduction of pensions: robust affordability studies; linkages with poverty reduction and long-term development strategies; and political support.

Zucco, C. (2010). *Cash Transfers and Voting Behavior: Redistribution and Clientelism in Developing Democracies*. Princeton University, Princeton USA.

<http://www.princeton.edu/csdp/events/Zucco0021011/Zucco021011.pdf>

What was the political impact of the government's Bolsa Família CCT programme in the 2006 Brazilian elections? This study concludes that Bolsa Família undoubtedly helped to re-elect President 'Lula' da Silva. While there is still considerable debate over the long-term implications of CCTs, the significant pro-incumbent electoral effects identified suggest that CCTs could be both 'good policy' and 'good politics'. Knowledge among politicians of these electoral effects could increase political will for the implementation of CCTs and reduce reliance on clientelism.

See also:

Haider, H. (2010). *Political Economy of Cash Transfers* (GSDRC Helpdesk Research Report 704).

Birmingham, UK: GSDRC, University of Birmingham.

<http://www.gsdr.org/go/display&type=Helpdesk&id=613>

Rao, S. (2011). *Examples of successful fuel subsidy removal* (GSDRC Helpdesk Research Report 754).

Birmingham, UK: GSDRC, University of Birmingham.

<http://www.gsdr.org/go/display&type=Helpdesk&id=754>

3.4 Targeting

Targeting refers to any mechanism to identify eligible individuals and groups, for the purposes of transferring resources or preferential access (Devereux et al., forthcoming). This is ultimately a political decision as to who deserves assistance. There are ongoing debates about targeting approaches and the appropriate degree of targeting.

Targeting has a variety of aims: to maximise poverty reduction; to contain the costs of provision and to make the most efficient use of resources when faced with budget limits; or for political gains (Devereux et al., forthcoming). The broadest form of targeting is categorical, which aims to reach every citizen passing a basic criterion, often age (e.g. pensions) or status (e.g. households with children under five years old). This may be seen as fair, and is unlikely to cause social tensions (Ellis, 2012). More narrowly targeted

programmes tend to have more complex criteria, usually based on poverty or vulnerability status (e.g. consumption; assets; income level; dependency level), or more than one eligibility criterion.

Untargeted programmes (sometimes referred to as ‘universal’) are likely to promote social unity and cohesion, but may not be progressive nor affordable (Slater & Farrington, 2009). Targeting may be more progressive than universalism because a greater share of resources reaches the poor (Slater & Farrington, 2009). Although programmes may draw on principles of universality, in reality they are always targeted to some extent, as few governments can afford to provide unlimited access to social protection for every citizen.

Key texts

Devereux, S., Masset, E., Sabates-Wheeler, R., Samson, M., Rivas, A. & Te Lintelo, D. (forthcoming, 2015). *Evaluating the targeting effectiveness of social transfers: A literature review*. Brighton: IDS

This review summarises knowledge on the errors, costs and secondary consequences (both positive and negative) of targeting in actual social transfer programmes in developing countries, in a comparative way across different types of programmes and different targeting mechanisms. It offers an updated synthesis of selected thinking and evidence on targeting. This report is structured around a review of empirical evidence from the literature on three key aspects of targeting – errors, costs, and cost-effectiveness.

Slater, R. & Farrington, J. (2009). *Targeting of Social Transfers: A Review for DFID*. London: ODI.

<http://www.odi.org.uk/resources/download/4521.pdf>

This paper assesses the costs, effectiveness and efficiency of social transfers. It concludes that means-testing or proxy testing may be beyond the capacity and finances of LICs, and that social categorical targeting is likely to remain a popular policy option, partly because of ease and partly because of political acceptability. Social protection interventions are invariably a patchwork of different programmes, and it remains important to track who is and is not reached and to design new interventions for the excluded.

See also:

Coady, D., Grosh, M. E. & Hoddinott, J. (2004). *Targeting of transfers in developing countries: Review of lessons and experience*. Washington DC: World Bank.

<http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2004/01/5176486/targeting-transfers-developing-countries-review-lessons-experience>

3.5 Conditionalities

There is an intensive debate about the desirability and effectiveness of conditionalities (also called conditions or co-responsibilities).

Some argue that conditionality is required to incentivise human development because the poor lack information or have misconceptions about investing in health and education and will not opt for this voluntarily (Arnold et al., 2011: 49; Fiszbein & Schady, 2009).

The counterargument is that the poor are rational actors, who will use public services effectively when cash constraints are eased (Arnold et al., 2011: 49). Evidence on UCTs shows that beneficiaries use the cash for more or less the same purposes as conditions encourage: healthcare; purchasing better quality food; sending children to school.

Rigorous evidence is emerging on both sides, with no conclusive lessons drawn (Baird et al., 2013). Both conditionality and non-conditionality are effective (Baird et al., 2011). Conditionalities should only be used in environments where the conditioned services exist and are able to cope with the increased demand (Arnold et al., 2011: 50), and where beneficiaries are capable of fulfilling conditions (Garcia & Moore, 2012: 219). Conditionality is commonly used in Latin America, and much less commonly in Sub-

Saharan Africa (Garcia & Moore, 2012: 117). Fragile states commonly use UCTs (Garcia & Moore, 2012: 118).

Key texts

Fiszbein, A. & Schady, N. (2009). *Conditional Cash Transfers: Reducing Present and Future Poverty*. World Bank Policy Research Report. Washington DC: World Bank.

http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTCCT/Resources/5757608-1234228266004/PRR-CCT_web_noembargo.pdf

Do conditional cash transfer programmes (CCTs) succeed in reducing inequality? Are they effective in producing better development outcomes? This 400-page report argues that CCTs have been effective in redistributing income to the poor, while recognising that even the best-designed and best-managed programme cannot fulfil all the needs of a comprehensive social protection system. Evidence suggests that to maximise their potential impact, CCTs should be complemented with other interventions, particularly those that focus on outcomes rather than the use of services alone. CCTs represent the best means of redistribution when: poor households do not sufficiently invest in the human capital of their children; and when political realities necessitate that redistribution be conditioned on good behaviour.

Baird, S., McIntosh, C. & Ozler, B. (2011). *Cash or Condition? Evidence from a Cash Transfer Experiment*. *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 126(4), 1709-1753. <http://irps.ucsd.edu/assets/037/11365.pdf>

This landmark study in Malawi designed a rigorous experiment comparing similar groups, one receiving a CCT and one receiving an UCT. The results showed no significant differences in outcomes. The CCT had higher impacts for enrolment, English reading comprehension, mathematics, and cognitive skills, and the UCT had higher impacts in reducing early marriage and pregnancy rates among out-of-school girls. This trade-off highlights that programme objectives must be carefully considered before deciding which kind of CT to employ – is the aim to increase schooling or decrease early marriage?

3.6 Shocks and risks

Some forms of social protection aim principally at helping households absorb shocks and mitigate risk. Shocks can be either idiosyncratic, affecting individuals or households (e.g. illness, job loss, deaths, weddings), or covariate, affecting whole communities (e.g. drought, failed harvest, price rises, conflict). There is much more evidence on social protection as a response to systemic or covariate shocks than on whether and how social protection helps protect individuals and households from idiosyncratic shocks.

Growing attention is being given to the potential for social protection systems to be able to scale-up in response to crises or shocks. The logic is that, in certain circumstances, this will be more timely and effective than a humanitarian response.

Scalability

The evidence of social protection programmes being able to respond to shocks in LICs is currently limited (Béné et al., 2012). Social protection was a relatively effective response to the food, fuel and financial (3F) crisis, but worked significantly better in countries with pre-existing social protection schemes, and for people in formal-sector employment (McCord, 2013). Over time, many low- and middle-income countries expanded or introduced social protection programmes as a response to the crisis (ILO, 2014). However, coverage and scale of programmes remained too small to meet the level of need (McCord, 2013).

Households experience crisis impacts differently, and the newly poor may have different needs and characteristics than the chronic poor, meaning existing systems may not be appropriate (McCord, 2013). Particularly, CCTs are usually intended as longer-term human capital investments and may not be appropriate as a crisis response aimed at transient poverty (Fiszbein et al., 2011). Existing CCTs in Latin America were adapted to respond to the 3F crisis by extending coverage, re-targeting to include newly

poor households, or increasing benefits (Grosh et al., 2014). There are no impact evaluations of these changes' effects on household incomes (Grosh et al., 2014).

Some countries used the crisis as a window of opportunity to make major changes in scale or administration of their programmes. For most people, informal social protection provided by friends and family was a more important source of security than formal social protection (Heltberg et al., 2013).

Key texts

Béné, C., Devereux, S. & Sabates-Wheeler, R. (2012). *Shocks and social protection in the Horn of Africa: Analysis from the productive safety net programme in Ethiopia*. IDS Working Paper 395. Brighton: IDS. <http://www.ids.ac.uk/files/dmfile/Wp395.pdf>

Using panel survey data from the Ethiopian Productive Safety Net Program (PSNP), this paper explores the degree to which the PSNP has been successful in protecting its beneficiaries against the various recent shocks that have affected the Horn of Africa. The analysis shows that PSNP beneficiaries who have been exposed to shocks have lower food security and wellbeing than PSNP recipients who had not been exposed to those same shocks. Drought stands out as the shock which most significantly affects households but illness and idiosyncratic shocks also appear to have significant impacts on food security. The results suggest that, although the PSNP seems to contribute to protecting households against shocks, the positive effects of the programme are not robust enough to shield recipient households completely against the impacts of severe shocks.

McCord, A. (2013). *ODI Shockwatch: Review of the literature on social protection shock responses and readiness*. London: ODI.

<http://www.odi.org.uk/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/8385.pdf>

How was social protection used as a response to the 3F crisis? The literature focuses on three conventional options: social assistance, social security, and active labour market policies. There is little focus on alternative social protection instruments. Scale-up is only possible when programmes are well established, and it can be hard for them to respond quickly to a crisis. Unemployment insurance, PWP, and active labour market policies are all considered ineffective.

Fiszbein, A., Ringold, D. & Srinivasan, S. (2011). *Cash Transfers, Children and the Crisis: Protecting Current and Future Investments*. *Development Policy Review*, 29(5), 585-601

<http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-7679.2011.00548.x>

This article describes new CCTs aimed at children introduced in response to the 3F crisis. The paper concludes that CCTs are better than no social assistance programme, but that there are drawbacks in their design that make them less appropriate for emergency contexts than other forms of social protection. The paper highlights the importance of having a system of safety nets in place before a crisis hits, as scaling up is much easier than implementing new programmes.

Grosh, M., Fruttero, A. & Oliveri, M.L. (2014). 'The Role of Social Protection in the Crisis in Latin America and the Caribbean'. In Grosh, M., Bussolo, M., & Freije, S. (Editors). *Understanding the Poverty Impact of the Global Financial Crisis in Latin America and the Caribbean*. Washington DC: World Bank. 199-262. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1596/978-1-4648-0241-6>

This chapter provides an overview of pre-crisis social protection in Latin America and the Caribbean, followed by an examination of how labour market and social assistance programmes developed and changed during the crisis period.

Heltberg, R., Hossain, N., Reva, A. & Turk, C. (2013). *Coping and Resilience during the Food, Fuel, and Financial Crises*. *The Journal of Development Studies*, 49(5), 705-718.

<http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00220388.2012.746668>

Which social protection interventions were most useful in the 3F crisis? This article aggregates qualitative field research from 17 developing countries. It finds that the main safety nets for most people were relatives, friends and mutual solidarity groups, which depleted as the crisis went on. Formal social

protection was much less accessible for most people, and inadequate for a global shock. The key problem was inadequate coverage, but other concerns included poor design and targeting, inadequate amounts and poor quality (of in-kind assistance). Free or subsidised education and school feeding programmes were popular and important sources of support, as were free or subsidised health services.

Climate change

Social protection, climate change adaptation (CCA) and disaster risk reduction (DRR) all share the same motivating principle of seeking to mitigate risks, reduce vulnerability and build resilience to livelihood shocks (Vincent & Cull, 2012). This overlap lends itself to integrated policies and programmes which address both social and environmental factors, with a long-term, preventative approach. This is known as 'adaptive social protection'.

Social protection, which helps protect against current shocks, can also create space for building adaptive capacity to protect against future shocks (Vincent & Cull, 2012). It could be used to target those whose livelihoods and status are vulnerable to climate change, reducing their dependence on climate-sensitive livelihoods strategies (Davies et al., 2009).

The evidence base that social protection can effectively reduce vulnerability to climate change is still quite thin, but is increasing (Vincent & Cull, 2012).

Key texts

Vincent, K. & Cull, T. (2012). *Adaptive Social Protection: Making Concepts a Reality*. Brighton: IDS. http://www.ids.ac.uk/files/dmfile/ASPGuidanceNotes_FINAL.pdf

This guide provides an inventory of existing toolkits on incorporating CCA and DRR into development projects and programmes, but notes a lack of focus on social protection programmes. To address this gap, the guide outlines the process required to incorporate CCA and/or DRR into social protection programmes. It provides case studies of integration, highlights barriers (institutional, legislative, technical and political) and suggests ways of addressing them. Social protection policymakers could broaden vulnerability assessments, taking into account projected future, as well as current, vulnerability.

Davies, M., Guenther, B., Leavy, J., Mitchell, T. & Tanner, T. (2009). *Climate Change Adaptation, Disaster Risk Reduction and Social Protection: Complementary Roles in Agriculture and Rural Growth?* IDS Working Paper 320. Brighton: IDS. <http://www.ids.ac.uk/files/dmfile/Wp320.pdf>

How can synergies between social protection, DRR, and CCA be identified and developed? Social protection initiatives are unlikely to succeed in reducing poverty if they do not consider both the short- and long-term shocks and stresses associated with climate change. The 'adaptive social protection' framework helps to identify opportunities for social protection to enhance adaptation, and for social protection programmes to be more climate-resilient. Adaptive social protection involves a long-term perspective that considers the changing nature of climate-related shocks and stresses, draws on rights, and aims to transform livelihoods.

See also:

Browne, E. (2014). *Social protection, climate change adaptation and disaster risk reduction*. (Rapid Literature Review.) Birmingham, UK: GSDRC, University of Birmingham. http://www.gsdr.org/docs/open/SP_CCA_DRR.pdf

Eldis guide to Adaptive Social Protection: <http://www.eldis.org/go/topics/resource-guides/climate-change/key-issues/adaptive-social-protection>

GSDRC's Disaster Resilience Topic Guide: <http://www.gsdr.org/go/topic-guides/disaster-resilience>

Haider, H. (2008). *Climate Change and Social Protection: How are social protection mechanisms being used to assist vulnerable communities adapt to the impacts of climate change (with particular*

attention to women and children)? (GSDRC Helpdesk Research Report 520). Birmingham, UK: GSDRC, University of Birmingham. <http://www.gsdrc.org/go/display&type=Helpdesk&id=434>

3.7 Fragile and conflict-affected states

Cash transfers have been effective in fragile and conflict-affected states (FCAS), offering a protective mechanism which can be administered quickly and relatively easily, with immediate impact. Where 'normal' systems have been disrupted, or do not exist in fragile states, there is also an opportunity for testing innovative ways of delivering transfers. UCTs have been used effectively in Somalia, Afghanistan, and DRC among others (Harvey et al., 2007). These programmes have been focused more towards immediate relief as a safety net, rather than long-term or transformative social protection (Harvey et al., 2007).

In principle, the same range of CTs, insurance, and labour market interventions are appropriate in both FCAS and development contexts (Harvey et al., 2007).

Challenges

Social protection is considered to be most appropriately delivered by the state, but this may not always be feasible in FCAS. There is a tension between the humanitarian norms of impartiality and neutrality, and social protection's necessary links to the state (Harvey et al., 2007). Development actors may need to maintain distance from the state in order to protect humanitarian space and deliver assistance to all populations, which may make social protection a difficult instrument to implement (Harvey et al., 2007).

State institutions in FCAS may lack requisite capacity, political will, or health and education services. Development partners may not be able to work directly with governments in FCAS. Where social protection is managed by non-state providers, this may risk undermining the state or causing resentment, particularly where NGOs divert funding and skills from government. Some argue all programmes should align with state policies where possible, and eventually be transferred to state control (Harvey et al., 2007).

Carpenter et al. (2012) identify a series of challenges for delivering social protection in FCAS: low administrative capacity; small revenue base; predatory or abusive governments; high levels of insecurity and risk; and the possibility of targeting causing further conflict.

Key texts

Harvey, P., Holmes, R., Slater, R. & Martin. (2007). *Social Protection in Fragile States*. London: ODI. <http://www.odi.org.uk/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/4547.pdf>

Is it possible to deliver social protection effectively in states that lack will or capacity? The paper argues that existing social protection frameworks provide an appropriate starting point. It identifies that there are some tensions between social protection's state-focused approach and the humanitarian principles of independence and neutrality, but these are not necessarily incompatible. Where states are abusive, unwilling or unable to engage, working through international actors is appropriate.

Carpenter, S., Slater, R. & Mallett, R. (2012). *Social Protection and Basic Services in Fragile and Conflict-Affected Situations*. Secure Livelihoods Research Programme (SLRC). London: ODI. <http://www.odi.org.uk/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/7859.pdf>

What is the state of the evidence on social protection in fragile states? This review finds that the evidence base is quite weak, with patchy data, and poor-quality normative literature, with only scattered empirical examples. It shows that social protection in FCAS is delivered predominantly by non-state actors, usually INGOs or UN agencies, with projects that are generally small-scale, with limited coverage and delivering food- or cash-based assistance. Government social protection systems are often weak, and generally do not go beyond cash transfer programmes of limited coverage or World Bank-led social

funds. Where they are more developed they are often ineffective, and people regularly pursue informal social protection strategies.

See also:

Haider, H. (2011). *Cash transfers in fragile/conflict-affected environments* (GSDRC Helpdesk Research Report 749). Birmingham, UK: GSDRC, University of Birmingham.

<http://www.gsdrc.org/go/display&type=Helpdesk&id=662>

3.8 State-building

Social protection may have potential to build state institutions and reinforce the social contract. This relationship is widely discussed but there is no rigorous evidence to support the link between social protection, state-building, and social cohesion (Carpenter et al., 2012). Most of the literature on this topic comes from FCAS, where there can be a post-conflict window of opportunity for state-building.

It is suggested that social protection may increase stability and state legitimacy by reinforcing the social contract (Harvey et al., 2007). Taking a universal rights-based approach to social protection, where all citizens become entitled to some benefits, can help restore some trust in public institutions (Jones & Shahrokh, 2013). Targeted approaches have been shown, in some contexts, to create social division, so may be best avoided in conflict-affected states and those with ethnic and social tensions. There is a tension between state-building objectives and the humanitarian principles of neutrality and independence (Harvey et al., 2007).

4 Policy objectives and evidence of impacts

Social protection can have a wide range of objectives and impacts, from food security, access to services, gender equality, and state-building, to social transformation. The emphasis in developing countries has been on poverty and vulnerability reduction, and human development, for which there is good evidence. There is less evidence on longer-term developmental impacts such as sustainable graduation from poverty, or better job prospects. The choice of objective depends on a range of factors.

Below are a selection of the objectives and impacts of social protection programmes.

4.1 Poverty and vulnerability

The primary aim for most social protection programmes is to reduce poverty and vulnerability. As noted above, different stakeholders have different conceptual approaches for achieving this. There is strong evidence that social protection can have significant impacts on both poverty and vulnerability. There is evidence of the positive effects of social transfers (in particular, social pensions and cash transfers) on poverty reduction and in reaching the chronically poor (Barrientos & Niño-Zarazúa, 2011). There is also evidence from Latin America that social transfers can reduce inequality (Fiszbein & Schady, 2009). There is some evidence that social protection also has negative effects on poverty indicators (Hagen-Zanker et al., 2011).

Key texts

Barrientos, A. & Niño-Zarazúa, M. (2011). *Social transfers and chronic poverty: objectives, design, reach and impact*. Chronic Poverty Research Centre Report.

http://www.chronicpoverty.org/uploads/publication_files/socialtransfersfullreport.pdf

The report focuses on three policy questions: first, do programme objectives address chronic poverty? Second, are programme design features – the identification and selection of beneficiaries, delivery mechanisms and complementary interventions – effective in reaching chronically poor households? And third, do social assistance programmes benefit the chronically poor? The broad conclusions are that social protection does reach the chronically poor, and that there are significant improvements in poverty reduction. The report examines the types of programme and design features which are shown to have more or less impact.

Hagen-Zanker, J., McCord, A. & Holmes, R. (2011). *Systematic review of the impact of employment guarantee schemes and cash transfers on the poor*. London: ODI.

<http://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/7161.pdf>

This review considers 37 studies with evidence on poverty indices, income, and expenditure. There are significantly more studies available on cash transfers (CTs) than on employment guarantee schemes (EGSs). Both CTs and EGSs have a predominantly, but not exclusively, positive impact on reducing poverty; 39 studies found positive impacts from either CT or EGS participation, and nine found negative impacts, generally from high-quality studies.

4.2 Education

Many social transfers seek to improve children's schooling, to invest in human capital and to break the intergenerational transmission of poverty (Barrientos & Niño-Zarazúa, 2011). Impacts of social protection on schooling have included, at both primary and secondary levels, increased enrolment, attendance, better grade progression, and decreased drop-out (Barrientos & Niño-Zarazúa, 2011). A systematic review shows that both CCTs and UCTs have positive effects on schooling enrolment and attendance. The effect sizes are larger for CCTs than UCTs, but the difference is not significant (Baird et al., 2013). Social

protection programmes which do not focus explicitly on schooling also have positive effects, for example, pensions are often used to pay grandchildren's school fees (Barrientos & Niño-Zarazúa, 2011).

While these immediate impacts are well-documented, there is less evidence on whether increased schooling translates into improved knowledge and educational attainment, better labour market outcomes, or an escape from chronic poverty (Barrientos & Niño-Zarazúa, 2011). The evidence on the effectiveness of CCTs and UCTs on improving test scores is small at best. More research is needed that looks at longer-term outcomes (Baird et al., 2013).

Key texts

Baird, S., Ferreira, F. H. G., Özler, B. & Woolcock, M. (2013). *Relative Effectiveness of Conditional and Unconditional Cash Transfers for Schooling Outcomes in Developing Countries: A Systematic Review*. Campbell Systematic Reviews 2013:8. The Campbell Collaboration.

<http://www.campbellcollaboration.org/lib/project/218/>

This systematic review provides evidence on the effectiveness of CCTs in improving schooling outcomes. The findings suggest that both CCTs and UCTs have a significant effect on enrolment. CCTs increase the odds of a child, aged between five and 22, being enrolled in school by 41 per cent and UCTs by 23 per cent. The effect sizes for enrolment and attendance are always larger for CCT programmes than UCTs but the difference is not significant. While interventions with no conditions or some conditions that are not monitored have some effect on enrolment rates (18-25 per cent improvement), programmes that are explicitly conditional, monitor compliance *and* penalise non-compliance have substantively larger effects (60 per cent improvement). Unlike enrolment and attendance, the effectiveness of cash transfer programmes on improving test scores is small at best.

See also:

Haider, H. (2010). *Social Protection and Access to Education* (GSDRC Helpdesk Research Report). Birmingham, UK: GSDRC, University of Birmingham.

<http://www.gsdr.org/go/display&type=Helpdesk&id=622>

4.3 Health

Social protection programmes can aim to improve health directly, e.g. by conditioning programmes on attendance at health services, or indirectly, e.g. through supplemented income and therefore consumption (Barrientos & Niño-Zarazúa, 2011). There is strong evidence on the positive health impacts of cash transfers and health insurance programmes, particularly on children's and maternal health outcomes. Most of the evidence comes from CCTs in Latin America, since these are often conditioned on health investments. Many CCT programmes include a number of health components, including incentivising attendance for health education, measurements of height and weight, immunisations and nutritional supplementation.

CCTs in Latin America have had strong impacts on improving health care check-ups for children, children's morbidity rates and immunisation, among others (Barrientos & Niño-Zarazúa, 2011). CCTs have also improved maternal health (Barrientos & Niño-Zarazúa, 2011). A systematic review concludes that CCTs appear to be effective in increasing the uptake of preventative health services, and encourage some preventative behaviours (Lagarde et al., 2009). The link between CCTs and health outcomes is less clear. In some cases programmes have noted improvement in health outcomes, though it is unclear to which components these positive effects should be attributed (Lagarde et al., 2009). There is some evidence to suggest that MICs have been more successful at meeting health needs than LICs, as LICs often do not have the supply capacity to meet demand (Barrientos & Niño-Zarazúa, 2011).

Key text

Lagarde, M., Haines, A. & Palmer, N. (2009). *The impact of conditional cash transfers on health outcomes and use of health services in low and middle income countries*. *Cochrane Database of Systematic Reviews* 2009, Issue 4. Art. No. CD008137. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/14651858.CD008137>

The systematic review includes ten papers reporting results from six intervention studies. Several CCT programmes provided strong evidence of a positive impact on the use of health services, nutritional status and health outcomes, assessed by anthropometric measurements and self-reported episodes of illness. Attribution to cash transfers specifically is difficult to ascertain. Several studies provide evidence of positive impacts on the uptake of preventive services by children and pregnant women. It found no evidence about effects on health care expenditure.

4.4 Nutrition

In theory, social protection has the potential to protect or improve the nutritional status of target groups in a number of ways. Improved economic status could enable households to access more nutritious diets, healthcare, and education, and to make improvements in water, sanitation and hygiene. All of these could help people remain well-nourished and to grow and develop properly. However, the evidence for the impact of social protection on nutrition remains mixed.

Evaluations of conditional cash transfer programmes in Latin America found that some, but not all, improved child growth (i.e. height). Only one looked at impact on wasting, but found no impact (Lagarde et al., 2009). These studies found that the age of the child and access to health care are more important for child growth than conditionalities (Manley et al., 2012). It has been suggested that ‘nudging’ beneficiaries (i.e. emphasising the importance of good nutrition but not attaching conditions) might be as effective. The evidence for unconditional cash transfers is also unconvincing (Ruel & Alderman, 2013). For example, evaluations of the Ethiopian Productive Safety Net Program have repeatedly found no discernible impacts on growth or risk for wasting among children in targeted households. Cash transfers, conditional and unconditional, have a slightly more positive effect on girls’ nutrition than that of boys (Manley et al., 2012).

There have been relatively few evaluations of the impact of food transfers on nutrition outcomes. A recent set of studies comparing food with cash transfers found variation in effect in different countries (Hoddinott et al., 2013). Very generally, food transfers had more of an impact on energy intake whereas cash transfers had more of an impact on dietary diversity. Whilst this effect has been seen in other studies, it is not consistent in all settings and has generally not been related to subsequent changes in growth or risk of wasting.

Recent reviews have shown that school feeding is not an effective way of improving nutrition outcomes, primarily because it fails to target children during the first 1000 days of their development (Alderman & Bundy, 2012). This is widely viewed as the critical window of opportunity for preventing malnutrition. There is emerging evidence that school feeding can have a positive impact on the nutrition of younger siblings. Whether this represents the most cost-effective way of achieving this outcome is debatable. Schools might provide a useful platform for promoting nutrition messages and for reaching adolescent girls (Bhutta et al., 2013). However, the benefits and risks of school-based nutrition programmes have not been tested.

Key texts

Manley, J., Gitter, S. & Slavchevska, V. (2012). *How Effective are Cash Transfer Programmes at Improving Nutritional Status? A Rapid Evidence Assessment of Programmes' Effects on Anthropometric Outcomes.* London: EPPI-Centre, Social Science Research Unit, Institute of Education, University of London.

<http://r4d.dfid.gov.uk/PDF/Outputs/SystematicReviews/Q33-Cash-transfers-2012Manley-rae.pdf>

Are conditional cash transfer programmes more successful than unconditional programmes at improving child health? This systematic assessment finds programmes diverge greatly in their effectiveness. Higher marginal effects are found in the most disadvantaged areas, and in countries with poorer health care systems. Girls benefit more than boys in height for age measures. Conditionalities linked to requiring work or savings behaviour adversely affect programme success.

Ruel, M. T. & Alderman, H. (2013). Nutrition-sensitive interventions and programmes: how can they help to accelerate progress in improving maternal and child nutrition? *The Lancet*, 382(9891), 536-551.

[http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736\(13\)60843-0](http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(13)60843-0)

This article is one in a series of four papers evaluating maternal and child nutrition, overweight and obesity in women and children, and their consequences in low- and middle-income countries. This paper reviews evidence of nutritional effects of programmes in four sectors—agriculture, social safety nets (SSN), early child development, and schooling. On social safety nets, the evidence base is quite robust in some areas, and shows that SSN have had weak impacts on child nutrition. This is potentially because of weaknesses in nutrition goals and actions, and poor service quality.

Hoddinott, J., Gilligan, D., Hidrobo, M., Margolies, A., Roy, S., Sandström, S., Schwab, B. & Upton, J. (2013). *Enhancing WFP's Capacity and Experience to Design, Implement, Monitor, and Evaluate Vouchers and Cash Transfer Programmes: Study Summary.* Washington, DC: IFPRI.

http://www.ifpri.org/sites/default/files/project_summary_final_july2013.pdf

The International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) evaluated four pilot projects to assess the comparative performance of cash transfers, food payments, and vouchers on household food security. The studies in Ecuador, Uganda, Niger, and Yemen were carried out over the period 2010–2012. In all countries, an experimental design was used with modalities (cash, food, vouchers) randomly assigned at a locality level, and each area had well-functioning grain markets. The research found that effectiveness depends heavily on context, including beneficiary preferences, quantity and quality of diet. CTs are always cheaper to deliver than food. There is little to no evidence that beneficiaries sell food transfers or use cash for undesirable purposes.

Alderman, H. & Bundy, D. (2012). School Feeding Programs and Development: Are We Framing the Question Correctly? *The World Bank Research Observer*, 27(2), 204-221.

<http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/wbro/lkr005>

How effective are school feeding programmes? The authors examine recent evidence and argue that school feeding is best viewed as an income transfer, with the strongest effects on reducing poverty and improving education and health. It is less useful to view school feeding as having direct impacts on nutrient deficiencies, enhancing learning or school attendance. It is not the best intervention for improving nutrition in children.

Bhutta, Z. A., Das, J. K., Rizvi, A., Gaffey, M. F., Walker, N., Horton, S., Webb, P., Lartey, A., Black, R.E., Lancet Nutrition Interventions Review Group, & Maternal and Child Nutrition Study Group. (2013). Evidence-based interventions for improvement of maternal and child nutrition: what can be done and at what cost? *The Lancet*, 382(9890), 452-477. [http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736\(13\)60996-4](http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(13)60996-4)

This comprehensive literature review examines the evidence on what works for improving maternal and child nutrition. The paper identifies ten interventions which are likely to reduce child deaths by 15 per cent globally. It suggests that community delivery mechanisms may offer the best opportunities to reach underserved populations.

See also:

Eldis guide to social protection and nutrition: http://www.eldis.org/go/topics/resource-guides/nutrition/nutrition-sensitive-development/social-protection#.UzKw7_I_sqY

The Lancet 4-paper series on maternal and child nutrition:
<http://www.thelancet.com/series/maternal-and-child-nutrition>

4.5 Graduation

Graduation refers to the ability of individuals or households to exit a social protection programme by passing an eligibility threshold. In some cases the term is also used to mean graduating out of poverty. Not all social protection programmes aim to graduate beneficiaries (e.g. pensions), and some households lack graduation potential (e.g. those with chronically sick members) (Garcia & Moore, 2012: 129). Graduation can be time-bound; income-sensitive; or self-selecting. Graduation can also refer to countries graduating from aid. Countries may seek to graduate from externally funded programmes to sustainable national programmes (Bundy et al., 2009).

Some draw a distinction between ‘threshold’ and ‘sustainable’ graduation for individuals or households, where the former constitutes passing an arbitrary threshold required to leave a programme, and the latter is a transformative transition out of poverty (Sabates-Wheeler & Devereux, 2011). The BRAC model follows the latter approach by targeting the extreme poor and helping them onto a path towards sustainable livelihoods (Hashemi & Umaira, 2011). Social protection alone is unlikely to graduate individuals or households out of poverty, but it can protect them against drivers of poverty such as distress sales of assets (Slater et al., 2014). The value of transfers is generally too low to lift the extreme poor out of poverty, constituting on average only 23 per cent of the household’s income (Gentilini et al., 2014).

Key texts

Sabates-Wheeler, R. & Devereux, S. (2011). *Transforming Livelihoods for Resilient Futures: How to Facilitate Graduation in Social Protection*. FAC Working Paper 23, Brighton: Future Agricultures Consortium.

http://opendocs.ids.ac.uk/opendocs/bitstream/handle/123456789/2320/FAC_Working_Paper_023.pdf?sequence=1

It is frequently claimed that the most innovative feature of social protection is that it has the potential to reduce the vulnerability of poor people to the extent that they can manage moderate risk without external support. This has led to an expansion of large-scale ‘productive safety net’ programmes. This paper maps out the theory of change underpinning graduation (threshold and sustainable graduation) and sets out the range of enabling and constraining factors that facilitate or undermine this process. The authors state that they are aware only of social protection programmes which reach threshold graduation. It is assumed that some programmes achieve sustainable graduation, but this has not been empirically tested.

Hashemi, S.M. & Umaira, W. (2011). *New Pathways for the Poorest: The graduation model from BRAC*. CSP Research Report 10. Centre for Social Protection, Brighton: IDS.

<http://www.ids.ac.uk/publication/new-pathways-for-the-poorest-the-graduation-model-from-brac>

BRAC has developed an extremely successful ‘graduation model’ in the Challenging the Frontiers of Poverty Reduction - Targeting the Ultra Poor (CFPR-TUP) programme. It combines support for immediate consumption with an asset grant to start an economic activity and provides skills training, basic health care assistance and access to financial services. Participants graduate when they pass the threshold from ‘extreme’ to ‘moderate’ poverty, and are encouraged to access BRAC’s standard microfinance programme. This report provides quantitative and qualitative evidence on the success of the model. Most households moved away from day labour towards self-employment and small businesses. Much of the

success rests on the confidence, empowerment, social networks and skill of the participant women. Structural barriers remain, and the model acknowledges that not everyone can graduate from extreme poverty through market-based economic livelihoods strategies.

See also:

Browne, E. (2013). *Post-graduation from social protection* (GSDRC Helpdesk Research Report 1035). Birmingham, UK: GSDRC, University of Birmingham.

<http://www.gsdrc.org/go/display&type=Helpdesk&id=1035>

IDS 'Graduation and Social Protection Conference', May 2014, Kigali, Rwanda:

<http://www.ids.ac.uk/events/graduation-and-social-protection-conference>

4.6 Empowerment

There is a major debate about whether and how social protection can empower poor, vulnerable or socially excluded people, but the evidence base is slim on this objective. Much of the literature on empowerment looks at women.

Most social protection programmes do not have the specific goal of women's empowerment, but many programmes have had intended and unintended effects on women (Holmes & Jones, 2010). These include: enhanced knowledge and skills; increased economic activity, credit and social capital; increased or decreased marital tensions (Holmes & Jones, 2010). Overall, women's decision-making power in the household and the community does not appear to increase as a result of social protection programmes (Holmes & Jones, 2010). The evidence on CCTs only weakly supports women's empowerment impacts (Molyneux, 2008).

A systematic review on the impacts of health insurance revealed that there is very little evidence on health insurance and community empowerment, seen as involvement of the community in the organisation of health services (Spaan et al., 2012). Partially this is because of the difficulties of measuring this kind of impact.

Key texts

Holmes, R. & Jones, N. (2010). *Rethinking Social Protection Using a Gender Lens*. Working Paper 320. London: ODI. <http://www.odi.org.uk/publications/5099-social-protection-gender>

To what extent is social protection programming reinforcing women's traditional roles and responsibilities, or helping to transform gender relations in economic and social spheres? This paper synthesises multi-country research, finding that the integration of gender into social protection approaches has so far been uneven at best. Broader policy commitment to gender equality and women's empowerment is not often reflected in social protection objectives. Overall, a comprehensive approach to tackling gender-specific vulnerabilities has been limited. However, all the programmes studied had both intended and unintended effects on women and gender relations. Attention to dynamics within the household can help to maximise positive programme impacts and reduce potentially negative ones.

Molyneux, M. (2008). *Conditional Cash Transfers: A Pathway to Women's Empowerment? Pathways of Women's Empowerment Working Paper 5*. Brighton: IDS.

<http://r4d.dfid.gov.uk/PDF/Outputs/WomenEmp/PathwaysWP5-website.pdf>

Are CCTs really providing long-term empowerment to women? This review of CCTs, particularly of PROGRESA in Mexico, argues that, although these programmes are widely replicated due to their perceived positive impact in reducing poverty, they reinforce asymmetric gender roles. PROGRESA aims to empower women, and women involved in the programmes report that, in general, they experience greater self-esteem, well-being and autonomy. However, the programme's gender bias reinforces the position of women as mothers, tying them more closely to the home.

Spaan, E., Mathijssen, J., Tromp, N., McBain, F., Have, A.T. & Baltussen, R. (2012). *The impact of health insurance in Africa and Asia: a systematic review*. *Bulletin of the World Health Organization*, 90(9), 685-692. <http://dx.doi.org/10.2471/BLT.12.102301>

Some 159 studies from Africa and Asia were included. The paper reviews impacts on: financial protection, utilisation, social inclusion, resource mobilisation, quality of care and community empowerment. Strong evidence shows that community-based health insurance (CBHI) and social health insurance (SHI) improve service utilisation and protect members financially by reducing their out-of-pocket expenditure, and that CBHI improves resource mobilisation too. Weak evidence points to a positive effect of both SHI and CBHI on quality of care and social inclusion. The effect of SHI and CBHI on community empowerment is inconclusive.

See also:

GSDRC's Voice, Empowerment and Accountability Topic Guide: <http://www.gsdr.org/go/vea>

Devereux, S., McGregor, J. A. & Sabates-Wheeler, R. (Eds.) (2011). *Social Protection for Social Justice (Special Issue)*. *IDS Bulletin* (42)6.

<http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/idsb.2011.42.issue-6/issuetoc>

4.7 Social exclusion

The main arguments for why social protection can reduce social exclusion are: a guaranteed minimum income can give greater independence, control, self-esteem, and the ability to contribute to community life (Babajanian et al., 2014). This is in addition to the expected benefits of greater investment in human capital and livelihoods support. At the macro level, making social protection a legal right can address drivers of social exclusion, and reduce the access costs of services and utilities (Babajanian et al., 2014).

There are few studies analysing the relationship between social protection and social exclusion, and therefore little evidence to draw on to establish causal pathways and possible outcomes. There is a very small evidence base which suggests that social protection programmes have some impact on inclusion, including social participation and social networks, but that interventions have not delivered transformative changes (Babajanian et al., 2014). There is also some evidence that interventions can address the drivers of social exclusion (Babajanian et al., 2014).

There is weak evidence that health insurance has a positive impact on social inclusion, measured through enrolment and utilisation patterns of vulnerable groups (Spaan et al., 2012). Health insurance can reach vulnerable groups by making enrolment free or discounted – cost is the main barrier cited by these groups (Spaan et al., 2012).

In many countries, social insurance and labour market programmes only benefit those in formal employment (World Bank, 2011). Informal and agricultural workers, and those who cannot work are often excluded (World Bank, 2011). The socially excluded are often also the hardest to reach, making it particularly difficult and expensive to include them (World Bank, 2011). Programmers may have to make a trade-off between coverage and cost-effectiveness (World Bank, 2011).

Key texts

Babajanian, B., Hagen-Zanker, J. & Holmes, R. (2014). *How do social protection and labour programmes contribute to social inclusion? Evidence from Afghanistan, Bangladesh, India and Nepal*. London: ODI.

<http://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/8922.pdf>

This paper draws on the findings from four country case studies: life skills education and livelihoods training for young women in Afghanistan; asset transfers in the Char river islands and a food transfer programme in Bangladesh; a health insurance programme in India; and the Child Grant cash transfer in Nepal. All interventions contributed to wellbeing outcomes. All interventions contributed to strengthening social relations, including social participation and social networks. However, the findings

also show that, on many occasions, the interventions have not delivered transformative changes in the lives and livelihoods of excluded households and individuals.

See also:

GSDRC's Social Exclusion Topic Guide: <http://www.gsdrc.org/go/topic-guides/social-exclusion>

Combaz, E. (2013). *Social inclusion in productive safety net programmes*. (GSDRC Helpdesk Research Report 1005). Birmingham, UK: GSDRC, University of Birmingham.
<http://www.gsdrc.org/go/display&type=Helpdesk&id=1005>

Rohwerder, B. (2014). *Disability inclusion in social protection*. (GSDRC Helpdesk Research Report 1069). Birmingham, UK: GSDRC, University of Birmingham.
<http://www.gsdrc.org/go/display&type=Helpdesk&id=1069>

4.8 Economic growth

The primary aim of social protection is usually to reduce poverty rather than to promote macro-level growth. There is more evidence on the impacts of social protection on local economic growth than macroeconomic growth. There is limited evidence of the effects of transfers, both in addressing inequality through redistributing resources, and in creating economic growth (Alderman & Yemtsov, 2014). All the evidence suggests only limited impacts on growth.

Social protection is commonly understood to help increase human capital, and therefore to enhance households' productivity in the long-term, as well as potentially to increase livelihood opportunities in the short term (Slater et al., 2014). There is strong evidence that CCTs could lead to increased household consumption and investment in education (Kabeer et al., 2012). Evidence suggests that transfers not only reduce immediate poverty but can also allow investments in assets for the future, contributing to inclusive growth (Alderman & Yemtsov, 2014). But the evidence on this is patchy.

Social protection can also help stimulate a local economy through the injection of cash, can create community assets, and improve local labour markets, for example by public works programmes increasing the demand for labour (Slater et al., 2014). Again, there is only patchy evidence for this. There is limited evidence that CCTs have spill-over effects on the local economy, though no evidence that they lead to local inflation (Kabeer et al., 2012).

Key texts

Alderman, H. & Yemtsov, R. (2014). How can safety nets contribute to economic growth? *The World Bank Economic Review*, 28(1), 1-20. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/wber/lht011>

How do social safety nets contribute to growth? There are four pathways: i) enabling households to make better investments in their future and changing incentives for investment in human capital; ii) managing risk; iii) creating assets and household-level investments; iv) safety nets can relax political constraints on policy. Growth alone is not a justification for implementing safety nets; this argument is secondary to poverty reduction and equity.

Slater, R., McCord, A. & Mathers, N. (2014). *Guidance note for DFID: Exploiting the synergies between social protection and economic development*. London: ODI.

<http://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/9096.pdf>

This note is intended to help DFID staff and others working on social protection to understand how to maximise synergies between social protection and economic development. It goes step-by-step through the knowledge, analysis, decisions and practical steps required to do this. It focuses on low-income countries, and local and community level growth. The guidance follows the cycle of designing and implementing a social protection programme and provides advice about what to do during each stage.

Kabeer, N., Piza, C. & Taylor, L. (2012). *What are the economic impacts of conditional cash transfer programmes? A systematic review of the evidence*. Technical report. London: EPPI-Centre, Social Science Research Unit, Institute of Education, University of London.

<http://r4d.dfid.gov.uk/pdf/outputs/systematicreviews/CCTprogrammes2012Kabeer.pdf>

This systematic review examines 46 papers with evidence on the economic effects of CCTs. It concludes that: the evidence is strong that CCTs could lead to a rise in overall household consumption, increase investment in productive assets, reduce child labour and increase school attendance. The evidence is mixed as to the impacts on adult labour, with increases in market work by both men and women in some contexts and increases in leisure and domestic work in others. There is persuasive evidence that CCTs protect household consumption and educational patterns during times of crisis. There is limited evidence that CCTs have spill-over effects within communities in terms of poverty reduction, increased loans and transfers and household behaviour. There is no evidence that CCTs lead to inflationary pressure in the local economy.

See also:

From Protection to Production studies the impact of cash transfer programmes on household economic decision-making and the local economy: <http://www.fao.org/economic/ptop/home/en/>

Tirivayi, N., Knowles, M. & Davis, B. (2013). *The interaction between social protection and agriculture: A review of evidence*. From Protection to Production. Rome: FAO. <http://www.fao.org/3/a-i3563e.pdf>

5 Vulnerable groups: needs and challenges

5.1 Women and girls

It is often women who require social protection interventions, as they are disproportionately vulnerable due to lack of capital, high wage differentials and gendered work norms, bearing the responsibility for childcare, and exclusion from basic services. Social assistance programmes, particularly conditional cash transfers, are often aimed at women as the recipient of the transfer and manager of the funds – 94 per cent of Bolsa Família recipients are women (Holmes & Jones, 2010: 1). In Sub-Saharan Africa, where unconditional programmes are more common, it is much less common to specify a female recipient (Garcia & Moore, 2012: 218). Programmes have positively impacted women and children's health, girls' education, and women's knowledge levels and empowerment within the household and community.

However, gender is rarely used as an analytical lens to assess programmes (Ganju Thakur et al., 2009). Newer analysis shows that programmes relying on female beneficiaries tend to reinforce and draw on 'traditional' values which assume women's altruistic roles towards children and families. This only empowers women as mothers and carers, not as individuals (Molyneux, 2008). Beneficiary women cannot always increase their control over household income, and conditions may only increase their domestic workload and time burden (Holmes & Jones, 2013: 70).

Key texts

Ganju Thakur, S., Arnold, C. & Johnson, T. (2009). 'Gender and Social Protection'. In *Promoting Pro-Poor Growth: Social Protection*. POVNET.

<http://www.oecd.org/dac/povertyreduction/promotingpro-poorgrowthsocialprotection.htm>

This chapter of the OECD's social protection strategy describes the challenges of integrating gender-sensitivity into social protection programming. It notes that gender is rarely used as a differentiating lens through which to understand poor people's exposure to risk and vulnerability. It outlines linkages between gender-sensitive programming and growth; gender-related risks; knowledge gaps; good practices; and policy implications.

Holmes, R. & Jones, N. (2013) *Gender and Social Protection in the Developing World: Beyond Mothers and Safety Nets*. London: Zed Books.

<http://www.zedbooks.co.uk/paperback/gender-and-social-protection-in-the-developing-world>

This book introduces a gender lens to social protection debates. Drawing on empirical evidence from poor households and communities in Africa, Asia and Latin America, the book provides insights into the effects of a range of social protection instruments. It concludes that, with relatively simple changes to design and with investment in implementation capacity, social protection can contribute to transforming gender relations at the individual, intra-household and community levels.

See also:

Rohwerder, B. (2014). *Social protection programmes supporting women survivors of domestic violence* (GSDRC Helpdesk Research Report 1130). Birmingham, UK: GSDRC, University of Birmingham.

<http://www.gsdrc.org/go/display&type=Helpdesk&id=1130>

5.2 Children

Children are more vulnerable to malnutrition, disease and abuse than adults, and are over-represented among the poor (UNICEF, 2012). Three elements of child vulnerability are: 1) biological and physical needs; 2) strategic needs (children's limited levels of autonomy and dependence on adults); and 3) institutional invisibility and lack of voice in policy agendas (Roelen & Sabates-Wheeler, 2012). There is a

window of opportunity for investing in children, with diminishing rates of return the older they get (UNICEF, 2012).

The purpose of social protection targeted at children is to help meet their basic needs, expand their opportunities to reach their full potential, overcome barriers to access services, and strengthen families' capacity to care for children (UNICEF, 2012). Primarily, children need access to health and education services, and care. Social protection can also target care-givers to meet children's needs, who may be parents, grandparents or other guardians.

Key texts

UNICEF. (2012). *Integrated Social Protection Systems: Enhancing Equity for Children – UNICEF Social Protection Strategic Framework*. New York: UNICEF.

<http://www.unicef.org/socialprotection/framework/>

UNICEF's approach and vision for social protection are presented in its first global social protection framework. It makes the case for child-sensitive social protection and argues for the expansion of inclusive, integrated social protection systems. The framework discusses the main components of effective integrated systems as well as current debates including social protection financing, expansion of coverage, and inclusive design. It also highlights emerging challenges in areas such as humanitarian action, adolescence, migration, and urban settings.

Roelen, K. & Sabates-Wheeler, R. (2012). *A Child-Sensitive Approach to Social Protection: Serving Practical and Strategic Needs*. *Journal of Poverty and Social Justice*, 20(3), 291-306.

<http://dx.doi.org/10.1332/175982712X657118>

Child-sensitive social protection (CSSP) has gained considerable momentum, particularly in a developing country context. CSSP requires a critical perspective and for context to guide its design and delivery. Claims about what makes social protection child-sensitive are often based on (widely agreed) assumptions rather than sound evidence about what works for children in a particular situation. There are no universal truths about how to design and deliver child-sensitive social protection. CSSP need not be a separate form of social protection; all types of interventions have the potential to carry a degree of child-sensitivity, although no current set of interventions can be considered child-sensitive across the board.

5.3 Older people

Older people face challenges including: lack of access to regular income, work and health care; declining physical and mental capacities; and dependency within the household (Sepulveda, 2010). Without income or work, older people tend to depend on others for their survival. They also usually have greater need for healthcare services and for domestic help. Women are likely to live longer than men, but becoming a widow may increase vulnerabilities if they have no land rights, assets or mobility to seek employment (Sepulveda, 2010).

Older people's interaction with social protection is usually in the form of an old age pension, a type of cash transfer. Contributory pensions are limited as they rely on formal employment, and coverage rates are low in low- and middle-income countries (Holzmann et al., 2009). This also has a gender dimension as fewer women than men are in the formal sector (Holzmann et al., 2009). Social pensions therefore address a gap for poor people, particularly women, and are politically popular (ADB, 2012). Older people, usually women, may also care for grandchildren, and may receive child benefits for this. There is a strong trend for this household role in Sub-Saharan Africa, with less evidence from other regions.

Key texts

Sepulveda, M. (2010). *The question of human rights and extreme poverty*. Report of the independent expert to the United Nations General Assembly, Human Rights Council, Fourteenth Session on 31 March 2010. http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/14session/A.HRC.14.31_en.pdf

This UN report examines whether social pensions help realise the right to social security and an adequate standard of living. It highlights that large numbers of people work outside formal employment and traditional informal support systems for older people are changing under the pressure of increased longevity, widespread poverty, HIV/AIDS and migration. The paper therefore recommends that states recognise social pensions as critical elements for the progressive realisation of the right to social security for older people.

Holzmann, R., Robalino, D. A. & Takayama, N. (2009). *The role of social pensions and other retirement income transfers: closing the coverage gap*. Washington DC: World Bank.

<http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2009/01/10894094/role-social-pensions-other-retirement-income-transfers-closing-coverage-gap>

The book has four specific objectives: (a) to discuss the role of retirement income transfers in the context of a strategy for expanding old-age income security and preventing poverty among the elderly; (b) to take stock of international experience with design and implementation; (c) to identify key policy issues that need to receive attention during the design and implementation phases; and (d) to offer some preliminary policy recommendations and propose next steps.

ADB. (2012). *Social Protection for Older Persons: Social Pensions in Asia*. Manila: Asian Development Bank. <http://www.adb.org/publications/social-protection-older-persons-social-pensions-asia>

This book examines the effectiveness and relevance of social pensions in supporting older persons in Asia. It discusses the political economy and financial sustainability of social pension reform; implications for gender equity and social rights; and design and implementation challenges. Case studies from Bangladesh, Nepal, Thailand, Viet Nam, and South Caucasus and Central Asia provide key lessons for informing development policy and practice.

See also:

HelpAge International: Social Pensions Database: <http://www.pension-watch.net/about-social-pensions/about-social-pensions/social-pensions-database/>

5.4 People with disabilities (PWD)

People with disabilities are often (sometimes incorrectly) assumed to be unable to work and therefore more permanent recipients of social protection. Evidence shows that PWD have higher rates of poverty, and face physical barriers, communication barriers, attitudinal barriers, and a lack of sensitivity or awareness (Rohwerder, 2014). PWD tend to be grouped together in social protection programming, with little distinction made between different kinds of disabilities, which may be physical or mental (Rohwerder, 2014). Disability also intersects with other inequalities, meaning disabled women and disabled older people may need special consideration.

Disability is rising on the social protection agenda, but coverage of PWD is still low. PWD may be included in mainstream programmes if they meet standard poverty criteria, or they may be targeted specifically (Gooding & Marriot, 2009). Mainstream programming is perhaps the easiest form of inclusion, but the programme benefits may not meet the specific needs of PWD. The most common form of support is unconditional cash transfers, but not all disabled people require social assistance grants (Schneider et al., 2011).

Key texts

Gooding, K. & Marriot, A. (2009). Including Persons with Disabilities in Social Cash Transfer Programmes in Developing Countries. *Journal of International Development*, 21(5), 685-698.

<http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/jid.1597>

Drawing on secondary material from literature reviews and interviews, the paper considers challenges in the design of cash transfer programmes, particularly barriers to access and the complexities of assessment, and the impact of transfers for persons with disabilities. The paper identifies key principles for including PWD in social transfer schemes, specifically: strong legal foundations; participation of persons with disabilities in programme design, implementation and evaluation; and embedding transfers within a wider framework of action to tackle discrimination and empower persons with disabilities.

Schneider, M., Waliuya, W., Munsanje, J. & Swartz, L. (2011). Reflections on Including Disability in Social Protection Programmes. *IDS Bulletin*, 42(6), 38-44.

<http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1759-5436.2011.00271.x>

This article presents reflections on disability in social protection, specifically in social assistance programmes, in Uganda, Zambia and South Africa. There are clear positive impacts from cash transfers, in basic needs and control and independence, leading to improved health status, access to investment opportunities, increased sense of worth, and greater participation in community activities. The paper looks briefly at: (a) factors associated with disability that create vulnerabilities for PWD and their household; (b) disability targeting; and (c) measurement of disability.

See also:

Rohwerder, B. (2014). *Disability inclusion in social protection*. (GSDRC Helpdesk Research Report 1069). Birmingham, UK: GSDRC, University of Birmingham.

<http://www.gsdr.org/go/display&type=Helpdesk&id=1069>

Oddsottir, F. (2014). *Social protection programmes for people with disabilities* (GSDRC Helpdesk Research Report 1137). Birmingham, UK: GSDRC, University of Birmingham.

<http://www.gsdr.org/go/display&type=Helpdesk&id=1137>

Development Pathways: The Disability Benefit Database

<http://www.developmentpathways.co.uk/resources/disability-benefits-scheme-database/>

5.5 Those not reached

The majority of the extreme poor in developing countries remain uncovered by social protection (Gentilini et al., 2014). Those working in the informal sector or the self-employed (more women than men) are usually not reached by state insurance schemes or contributory pensions, and their irregular wages do not support regular insurance contributions. Migrants usually have trouble accessing programmes aimed only at citizens, although they are often among the poorest.

6 Design and implementation

This section provides links to key manuals, guidance and other practical resources.

6.1 General manuals

Devereux, S. (2008). *Innovations in the Design and Delivery of Social Transfers: Lessons Learned from Malawi*. IDS and Concern Worldwide.

https://www.concern.net/sites/default/files/resource/2011/03/ids_social_transfers_malawi_2007.pdf

Grosh, M., del Ninno, C., Tesliuc, E. & Ouerghi, A. (2008). *For Protection and Promotion: The Design and Implementation of Effective Safety Nets*. Washington DC: World Bank.

http://siteresources.worldbank.org/SPLP/Resources/461653-1207162275268/For_Protection_and_Promotion908.pdf

Holmes, R. & Jones, N. (2010). *How to design and implement gender-sensitive social protection programmes*. ODI Toolkit, London: ODI.

<http://www.odi.org.uk/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/6262.pdf>

ILO/WHO. (2009). *Social Protection Floor Initiative: Manual and Strategic Framework for Joint UN Country Operations*. Geneva: ILO/WHO.

<http://www.ilo.org/gimi/gess/RessShowRessource.do?ressourceId=14484>

Robalino, D. A., Rawlings, L. & Walker, I. (2012). *Building social protection and labor systems: concepts and operational implications*. Washington DC: World Bank.

<https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/13554/676080NWP012020Box367885B00PUBLIC0.pdf?sequence=1>

Samson, M., van Niekerk, I. & MacQuene, K. (2011). *Designing and Implementing Social Transfer Programmes: A Policy Manual*. Cape Town: Economic Policy Research Institute.

<http://epri.org.za/resources/book/>

6.2 Targeting

Coady, D., Grosh, M. & Hoddinott, J. (2004). *Targeting of transfers in developing countries: review of lessons and experience*. Washington DC: World Bank.

http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2004/10/14/000160016_20041014155821/Rendered/PDF/302300PAPER0Targeting0of0transfers.pdf

Devereux, S., Masset, E., Sabates-Wheeler, R., Samson, M., Rivas, A. & Te Lintelo, D. (forthcoming, 2015). *Evaluating the targeting effectiveness of social transfers: A literature review*. Brighton: IDS

Kidd, S. & Wylde, E. (2011). *Targeting the Poorest: An assessment of the proxy means test methodology*. Canberra: AusAID.

http://aid.dfat.gov.au/Publications/Pages/7044_2239_6308_4104_9028.aspx

Slater, R. & Farrington, J. (2009). *Making Social Transfers Appropriate, Achievable and Acceptable: A Practical Tool for Good Targeting*. London: ODI.

<http://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/5757.pdf>

6.3 Conditionality

Fiszbein, A. & Schady, N. (2009). 'Chapter 6: CCTs: Policy and Design Options'. In Fiszbein, A. & Schady, N. *Conditional Cash Transfers: Reducing Present and Future Poverty*. World Bank Policy Research Report. Washington DC: World Bank. http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTCCT/Resources/5757608-1234228266004/PRR-CCT_web_noembargo.pdf

Hanlon, J., Barrientos, A. & Hulme, D. (2010). 'Chapter 8: Co-responsibility and Services: The Conditionality Dilemma'. In Hanlon, J., Barrientos, A. & Hulme, D. (eds.) *Just Give Money to the Poor: The Development Revolution from the Global South*. Sterling, VA: Kumarian Press. <http://books.google.co.uk/books?id=M2WWHlZQON0C&printsec=frontcover#v=onepage&q&f=false>

6.4 Payment

Barca, V., Hurrell, A., MacAuslan, I., Visram, A. & Willis, J. (2013). Paying attention to detail: how to transfer cash in cash transfers. *Enterprise Development and Microfinance*, 24 (1), 10-27. <http://practicalaction.metapress.com/content/t136r15h40578156/>

Devereux, S. & Vincent, K. (2010). Using Technology to Deliver Social Protection: Exploring Opportunities and Risks. *Development in Practice*, 20(3), 367-379. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09614521003709940>

DFID. (2009). *Designing and Implementing Financially Inclusive Payment Arrangements for Social Transfer Programmes*. London: Department for International Development. <http://www.microfinancegateway.org/sites/default/files/mfg-en-toolkit-designing-and-implementing-financially-inclusive-payment-arrangements-for-social-transfer-programmes-dec-2009.pdf>

Hanlon, J., Barrientos, A. & Hulme, D. (2010). 'Chapter 9: Cash Transfers Are Practical in Poor Countries'. In Hanlon, J., Barrientos, A. & Hulme, D. (eds.) *Just Give Money to the Poor: The Development Revolution from the Global South*. Sterling, VA: Kumarian Press. <http://books.google.co.uk/books?id=M2WWHlZQON0C&printsec=frontcover#v=onepage&q&f=false>

Smith, G., MacAuslan, I., Butters, S. & Trommé, M. (2012). *New Technologies in Cash Transfer Programming and Humanitarian Assistance*. The Cash Learning Partnership. <http://www.cashlearning.org/resources/library/272-new-technologies-in-cash-transfer-programming-and-humanitarian-assistance>

6.5 Accountability

Bassett, L., Giannozzi, S., Pop, L. & Ringold, D. (2012). *Rules, Roles, and Controls: Governance in Social Protection with an Application to Social Assistance*. Washington DC: World Bank. <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/SOCIALPROTECTION/Resources/SP-Discussion-papers/430578-1331508552354/1206.pdf>

OPML. (2012). *Review of and Recommendations for Grievance Mechanisms for Social Assistance Programmes, Indonesia*. Oxford: Oxford Policy Management. <http://www.opml.co.uk/projects/review-and-recommendations-grievance-mechanisms-social-assistance-programmes-indonesia>

Samuels, F., Jones, N. with A. Malachowska (2013). *Holding Cash Transfers to Account: Beneficiary and community perspectives*. London: ODI. <http://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/8380.pdf>

Van Stolk, C. & Tesliuc, E.T. (2010). *Toolkit on Tackling Error, Fraud and Corruption in Social Protection Programs*. SP Discussion Paper No. 1002. Washington DC: World Bank. <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/SOCIALPROTECTION/Resources/SP-Discussion-papers/Safety-Nets-DP/1002.pdf>

Vij, N. (2011). Collaborative Governance: Analysing Social Audits in MGNREGA in India. *IDS Bulletin*, 42(6), 28–34. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1759-5436.2011.00269.x>

6.6 Administrative systems

Baldeon, C. & Arribas-Banos, M. (2008). *Management Information Systems in Social Safety Net Programs: A Look at Accountability and Control Mechanisms*. SP Discussion Paper No. 0819. Social Protection and Labour. Washington, DC: World Bank.

<http://www.developmentpathways.co.uk/downloads/mis-systems-for-social-safety-nets.pdf>

Barca, V. & Chirchir, R. (2014). *Single registries and integrated MISs: De-mystifying data and information management concepts*. Canberra: Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade.

<http://www.developmentpathways.co.uk/resources/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/REPORT-DFAT-Single-registries-report.pdf>

Chirchir, R. & Kidd, S. (2011). *Good Practice in the development of management information systems for social protection*. Pension Watch briefing paper no. 05. Development Pathways (UK) and HelpAge International (UK). <http://www.developmentpathways.co.uk/publications/good-practice-in-the-development-of-management-information-systems-for-social-protection>

See also: Rao, S. (2013). *National databases of the poor for social protection*. GSDRC Helpdesk Research Report 1007. Birmingham, UK: GSDRC, University of Birmingham.

<http://www.gsdr.org/go/display&type=Helpdesk&id=1007>

6.7 Monitoring and evaluation

Dissanayake, R., Stephenson, Z. & Greenslade, M. (2012). *Evaluating social transfer programmes. Guidance for DFID country offices*. London: Department for International Development.

<http://www.cpc.unc.edu/projects/transfer/publications/other/DFIDGuidanceForEvaluatingSocialTransferProgrammesJune2012.pdf>

ILO. (2006). *Inter-agency social protection assessment tools*. International Labour Organization

<http://www.social-protection.org/gimi/gess/ShowWiki.action?wiki.wikiId=2361>

Roelen, K. & Devereux, S. (2014). *Evaluating Outside the Box: Mixing Methods in Analysing Social Protection Programmes*. CDI Practice Paper. Brighton: Centre for Development Impact, IDS.

<http://www.ids.ac.uk/publication/evaluating-outside-the-box-mixing-methods-in-analysing-social-protection-programmes>

World Bank. (2013). *Monitoring and evaluating social protection programs' efforts to respond to natural disasters and climate change-related shocks*. Building resilience guidance note: No. 4. Washington DC: World Bank.

<http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2013/06/18119988/monitoring-evaluating-social-protection-programs-efforts-respond-natural-disasters-climate-change-related-shocks>

See also:

Browne, E. (2014). *Social transfer evaluation syntheses* (GSDRC Helpdesk Research Report 1066). Birmingham, UK: GSDRC, University of Birmingham.

<http://www.gsdr.org/go/display&type=Helpdesk&id=1066>

M'Cormack, F. (2011). *Beneficiaries' perspectives in research on cash transfer and social protection programmes*. (GSDRC Helpdesk Research Report 775). Birmingham, UK: GSDRC, University of Birmingham. <http://www.gsdr.org/go/display&type=Helpdesk&id=721>

6.8 Market impacts

Brown, A. J. & Koettl, J. (2012). *Active labor market programs employment gain or fiscal drain?* (No. 1785). Kiel Working Paper. <https://www.ifw-members.ifw-kiel.de/publications/active-labor-market-programs-employment-gain-or-fiscal-drain/KAP%201785.pdf>

Card, D., Kluve, J. & Weber, A. (2010). *Active Labour Market Policy Evaluations: A Meta-Analysis**. *The Economic Journal*, 120(548), F452-F477. <http://davidcard.berkeley.edu/papers/card-kluve-weber-EJ.pdf>

OECD. (2011). 'Chapter 2. The labour market effects of social protection systems in emerging economies'. In *OECD Employment Outlook 2011*. Paris: OECD. http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/empl_outlook-2011-4-en

Ribe, H., Robalino, D. & Walker, I. (2012). 'Chapter 2. Labor Markets in Latin America and the Caribbean: Structure, Dynamics and Implications for the Design of Social Protection Policies'. In Ribe, H., Robalino, D., & Walker, I., *From Right to Reality: Incentives, Labor Markets, and the Challenge of Universal Social Protection in Latin America and the Caribbean*. Washington DC: World Bank. <http://hdl.handle.net/10986/6008>

6.9 Value for money

Cherrier, C., Gassmann, F., Mideros Mora, A. & Mohnen, P. (2013). *Making the Investment Case for Social Protection: Methodological challenges with lessons learnt from a recent study in Cambodia*. Working Paper 2013-06. Florence: UNICEF Office of Research. http://www.unicef-irc.org/publications/pdf/iwp_2013_06.pdf

Ellis, F. (2012). 'We Are All Poor Here': Economic Difference, Social Divisiveness and Targeting Cash Transfers in Sub-Saharan Africa. *The Journal of Development Studies* 48(2), 201-214. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00220388.2011.625408>

ILO costing and assessment tools: <http://www.socialprotectionfloor-gateway.org/24.htm>

White, P., Hodges, A. & Greenslade, M. (2013). *Guidance on measuring and maximising value for money in social transfer programmes* (2nd Ed.). London: Department for International Development. https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/204382/Guidance-value-for-money-social-transfers-25Mar2013.pdf

6.10 Complementary interventions

Macours, K., Premand, P. & Vakis, R. (2012). *Transfers, Diversification and Household Risk Strategies: Experimental Evidence with Lessons for Climate Change Adaptation*. Washington DC: World Bank. <http://elibrary.worldbank.org/doi/pdf/10.1596/1813-9450-6053>

McCord, A. (2012). *Skills development as part of social protection programmes*. Background paper prepared for the Education for All Global Monitoring Report 2012. London: ODI. <http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0021/002178/217883e.pdf>

Nehring, R. (2012). *Linking Social Protection and Agricultural Production: The Case of Mexico*. Policy Research Brief 21, Brasilia: International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth. <http://ideas.repec.org/s/ipc/pbrief.html>

Roelen, K. & Delap, E. (2012). *Researching the links between social protection and children's care in Sub-Saharan Africa – a concept note*. IDS and Family for Every Child. <http://www.ids.ac.uk/files/dmfile/RoelenDelap2011ConceptNote-SocialProtectionandChildrensCare2.pdf>